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In the United States tobacco use causes more deaths each year than
AIDS, car accidents, alcohol, homicides, illegal drugs, suicides, and
fires combined.1
The cigarette should be conceived not as a product but as a pack-
age. The product is nicotine.... Think of the cigarette pack as a
storage container for a day's supply of nicotine .... 2
1 Food and Drug Administration Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribu-
tion of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61
Fed. Reg. 44,395, 44,398 (Aug. 28, 1996). For recent data on deaths caused by to-
bacco use, see Office on Smoking and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, Cigarette Smoking-Related Mortality, at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/osh/
mortali.htm (July, 1996).
2 Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 51, Tex. Carpenters
Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000) (No.
1:97CV0625) (quoting the remarks of William L. Dunn, Jr., a Philip Morris scientist,
in an internal memorandum); see also Doug Levy & Tim Friend, In 1994, FDA Put on
the Spot Tobacco Firms' Studies at Issue, USA TODAY, July 3, 1996, at 5A (reporting the
statement ofJoseph Califano, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, that had it
been known that nicotine was addictive in 1979 an official report would have been
issued to that effect). For a good discussion of the degree of knowledge obtained in
private by the industry, see Juan Carlos Lopez-Campillo, Tobacco Company Liability
Under Mail Fraud, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 441, 450 (1998).
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If proven to be true, the allegations demonstrate that the defend-
ants intentionally bargained away the lives and health of tens of mil-
lions of Americans for profit. While the law is forced to address
allegations of malfeasance on a continual basis, rarely if ever have
American courts been faced with allegations of fraud so nefarious in
nature, so wide in scope, or so broad in impact. The moral blame
attached to such conduct, and society's policy in preventing harms
in the future, could scarcely argue more strongly in favor of a find-
ing of proximate cause.
3
INTRODUCTION
The Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Actl (RICO)
was enacted in 1970 to respond to the special challenge of enterprise
criminality, that is, a pattern of specified crimes (violence, provision of
illegal goods and services, corruption in government, and fraud), by,
through, or against enterprises, licit and illicit.5 Its legislative history
indicates that it was intended to provide "new weapons of unprece-
dented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its economic
roots."6 While RICO was designed to control organized crime, the
idea that the statute is limited in application to organized crime "finds
no support in the Act's text, and is at odds with the tenor of its legisla-
tive history."7 Organized crime, in short, provided the occasion for its
3 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 560,
584 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
4 Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (1994). RICO is a
prosecutorial and plaintiff's tool that can be used for a multiplicity of purposes. The
drafters envisioned it as a vehicle to take money out of the hands of racketeers and
keep them from investing it in businesses, with the goal of eventually stifling entire
corrupt underground operations. See G. Robert Blakey, The RICO CivilFraud Action in
Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NoTRE DAaE L REv. 237, 253-55 (1982).
5 RICO was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L No.
91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970). According to the Fifth Circuit, enterprise crimi-
nality includes "all types of organized criminal behavior [ranging] from simple politi-
cal corruption to sophisticated white-collar crime schemes to traditional Mafia-type
endeavors." United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting G.
Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO):
Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TF_%iw. L.Q. 1009, 1013-14 (1980)).
6 Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
7 H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 244 (1989) ("Congress drafted
RICO broadly enough to encompass a wide range of criminal activity, [more than
organized crime,] taking many different forms and likely to attract a broad array of
perpetrators operating in many different ways."); see also Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald
Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing RICO's applica-
tion beyond organized crime).
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drafting, but the statute applies to "any person."8 RICO authorizes a
wide range of sanctions aimed at stifling illegal conduct.9 Among
other remedies, the statute provides for recovery for injury to business
or property occurring "by reason of" a violation of the statute. 10
Section 1964(c) reads, "Any person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may
sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall
recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."1
The focus of this Note is the debate over the § 1964(c) language
"by reason of" in the context of the recent tobacco litigation. 12 The
Supreme Court has held that "by reason of" means proximate cause
in the traditional tort sense of the phrase. 13 The interpretation of this
language is a recurring issue among circuit courts of appeals. 14 This
Note will examine, in chronological order, the decisions of the Sec-
ond, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts in the Philip
Morris litigation. This recent litigation provides an apt framework for
a discussion of § 1964(c). The critical issue in the litigation was deter-
mining whether the relationship between the illegal actions of the to-
bacco industry and the plaintiffs' claimed injuries was "proximate."
The fraud perpetuated by the industry has caused, and continues to
8 See Owl Constr. Co., 727 F.2d at 542 ("[A]lithough the legislative history of RICO
vividly demonstrates that it was primarily enacted to combat organized crime, nothing
in that history, or in the language of the statute itself, expressly limits RICO's use to
members of organized crime." (quoting United States v. Uni Oil, Inc., 646 F.2d 946,
953 (5th Cir. 1981))); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)
("Congress wanted to reach both 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises .... The
former... enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity
from its consequences.").
9 Such remedies include fines, imprisonment, forfeiture, injunctions, and treble
damages. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
10 See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983) (providing an
excellent account of the pleading burden for a civil RICO case, discussing each ele-
ment in turn).
11 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Supp. 1998).
12 The States proceeded against the tobacco industry under, among other theo-
ries, RICO.
13 See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
14 See Tex. Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788,
789 (5th Cir. 2000); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund
v. Philip Morris Inc., 196 F.3d 818, 825-26 (7th Cir. 1999); Laborers Local 17 Health
& Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229, 234-36 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct. 799 (2000); Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip
Morris Inc., 185 F.3d 957, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 789 (2000);
Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912,
921 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 844 (2000).
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cause, countless, devastating consequences; however, as will be shown
in this Note, the circuit courts of appeals show no willingness to find
that'the industry's fraud is their "proximate cause."
This Note will explain how the circuit courts are engaging in an
improper proximate cause analysis by either substituting a formal di-
rect-indirect analysis for the mandated policy-based inquiry on the "re-
moteness" prong of "proximate cause" or by misapplying the policy-
based methodology to deselect all plaintiffs instead of to select the
best enforcer of RICO, leaving a fraud of unprecedented scope and
impact unremedied under RICO. This policy-based methodology for
RICO was set out by the Supreme Court in 1992.15 Parts II and III will
discuss the tobacco controversy underlying these lawsuits. Parts IV
and V will provide an excursus on the history and current Supreme
Court treatment of "proximate cause" and "remoteness." Finally, Part
VI will examine the misapplication of law by the Second, Third, Fifth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in the tobacco litigation. This Note con-
cludes that the failure to properly analyze this issue not only leaves a
massive fraud unremedied, but has wide-reaching ramifications for
the future of RICO and other areas ofjurisprudence.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
Tobacco is the only consumer product that is not capable of be-
ing used safely.16 It is also the "single most important preventable
cause of death in our society."17 Every year about four million people
die of tobacco-related illnesses.'8 Cigarettes are presently known to
contain at least forty-three different carcinogenic chemicals.19 The
diseases caused by cigarette smoking are numerous. They include
cancers of the mouth, larynx, esophagus, stomach, pancreas, uterus,
cervix, kidney, and colon.20 The Treasury Department estimates that
15 See Holmes, 503 U.S. 258.
16 See RIcHARD ELUGER, ASHES TO AsHEs 412 (1996).
17 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HurmAN SERvs., CDC REDucNc m HEALTH CoNSE-
QUENCES OF SMOmNG: 25 YEARS OF PROGREsS-A REPoRT OF THE SURGEON GE,.RAL 11
(1989), at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr_1989.htm (on file vth the A'olre Dame
Law Rw).
18 SeeWoatn HEALTH ORG., MAKMNG A DIFFERENcE 65 (1999). The Surgeon Gen-
eral characterized smoking as "the most important health issue of our time." SuR-
GEON GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HmiAN SFRvs., REDuCIcN THE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES OF SMOIMUG: CAicER, at xi (1982).
19 SeeAmerican Lung Association, Fact Shet Smoking at http://xiv.Iungusa.org/
tobacco/smokingfactsheet99.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2000).
20 See generally http://www.philipmorris.com/tobaccobus/tobacco-issues/
link22(2).html (last modified OcL 8, 1999) (citing U.S. DnE'T OF H%LTH & Hmtma
SERVS., SMOKING AND HALTH, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENF.mL (1979) (reporting
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sixty billion dollars are spent each year on treating smoking related
injuries.2 ' Of this sixty billion, twenty-one billion is borne by the fed-
eral government.
22
Tobacco use is especially prevalent among young adults. 23 In
America, it is illegal in all fifty states and the District of Columbia to
sell tobacco to children.2 4 Nevertheless, despite the existence of such
rules, the laws prohibiting the sale of tobacco to minors are not strin-
gently enforced. 25 "Approximately three million U.S. adolescents are
smokers, and they smoke nearly one billion packs of cigarettes each
year."
26
II. CONSPIRACY OF TOBACCO INDUSTRY
A. Overview
Although the tobacco industry knew of the link between smoking
and disease, particularly cancer, it took measures to obfuscate that re-
mortality statistics among smokers and discussing link between smoking and disease
but not stating that nicotine is addictive)).
21 See Wendy Koch, Clinton Pushed to Sue Tobacco Firms, USA TODAY, July 14, 1998,
at 1A. For further information regarding government costs due to tobacco use, see
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMtAN, SERvs., Medical-Care Expenditures Attributable to Ciga-
rette Smoking-United States, 1993, in 43 CDC MORBIDInY & MoRTAtIT WKLY. R. 469,
470 (July 8, 1994) (estimating that $50 billion was spent on smoking related medical
costs in 1993).
22 See Koch, supra note 21, at 1A. The federal government recently filed suit
against the tobacco industry, seeking disgorgement, not treble damages, under RICO.
For more information about the complaint, see Action on Smoking & Health, Home
Page, at http://www.ash.org (last visited Sept. 5, 2000). See also Bob Van Voris, Many
Legal Questions Endure for U.S. v. Industry, at http://www.no-smoking.org./oct99/
10-08-99-1.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2000) (quoting Bob Van Voris, DOJ Tobacco Suit
A Long Shot, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 11, 1999, at Al).
23 For a good summary of youth tobacco use around the world, see WoRLD
HEALTH ORG., ToBAcco USE BY YOUTH: A SuvEiLLANcE REPORT FROM THE GLOIIAL
YOUTH ToBAcco SURVEY PROJECT 2000, at 869-71 (2000). See also, U.S. DEr'T Or
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Reasons for Tobacco Use and Symptoms of Nicotine Withdrawal
Among Adolescent and Young Adult Tobacco Users-United States, 1993, in 43 CDC Moit.
BmrrY & MoRTALrSY Wyxm. REP. 745, 745 (Oct. 21, 1994) ("Among adults in the
United States who have ever smoked daily, 91.3% tried their first cigarette and 77.0%
became daily smokers before age 20 years.").
24 See U.S. DEP'T OF H-ALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TOBACCO USE AND USUAL SOURCE
OF CIGARETrEs AMONG HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS-UNITED STATES, 1995, at 413 (1996).
25 SeeWoRLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 23, at 874; see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTr &
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 24, at 413.
26 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERvs., Changes in Cigarette Brand Preferences of
Adolescent Smokers-United States, 1989-1993, in 43 GDC MORBIDITY & MORTALrn'
WxLY. REP. 577, 577 (Aug. 19, 1994).
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ality from the time that it received the information. The information
the industry suppressed dealt primarily with the issues of the carcino-
genic nature of tobacco and the addictive properties of nicotine. A
summary of the massive fraud perpetrated upon the government27
and the general public follows.
28
In the late 1800s very few Americans used tobacco products.29
The industry was expanding, however, and by 1950 one-half of the
American adult population were smokers. 30 Around 1953 a decline in
cigarette use was noted, and tobacco stock prices began to slide.31
Smokers were becoming increasingly aware of minor throat and
mouth irritations, and many were trying to quit the habit 3 2 The to-
bacco industry responded by trying to make cigarettes more appeal-
ing. This campaign took the form of marketing and advertising.
27 The industry actually addressed the role of the government in its efforts to shift
the costs of smoking from themselves to others. An internal memorandum of British
American Tobacco in 1974 stated: "We should influence medical and Government
opinion and get each group to accept some responsibility for helping to solve what is
seen as a major public health program [sic] rather than putting all the onus on the
industry." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Wel-
fare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denicd, 120 S. Ct. 844
(2000) (No. 98-1426). A similar Philip Morris internal memorandum from 1978
evinces the same logic.
Health care costs are rising at an alarming rate: $42 billion in 1966, S163
billion in 1977, $310 billion in 1983 (anticipated). More industry antago-
nists are using an economic argument against cigarettes: i.e., cigarettes cause
disease; disease requires treatment; major health care costs are borne by the
government; the taxpayers pay in the end .... We must be prepared to
counter this line of argument.
Id.
28 The information contained in this Section represents that vwhich was awailable
to the courts that decided the Funds' cases against the tobacco industry in 1997. The
facts have been set out in this fashion because none of the circuit courts of appeals
who took up the Funds cases recited the facts that were before them. Supreme Court
precedent mandates that lower courts accept a well-pleaded fact scenario. See Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); see also H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,
249-50 (1989); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (stating that a
court may dismiss a complaint only "if it is clear that no relief could be granted under
any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations" (citing Conle, 355
U.S. at 45-46)). For a good summary of the tobacco industry's misconduct, see
Daniel Givelber, Note, Cigarette Law, 73 IND. UJ. 867, 888-93 (1998). For in-depth
analyses of the industry's actions throughout the controversy, see STmruoN A. GL%=rz
ET Al., THE Cic.rrrT PAPats 339-90 (1996); PHIuP J. HiLTs, SOioiscREEN: THE
TRUTH BEHIND r=m ToBAcco IN'maur CovER-UP 102-71 (1996).
29 See HUTrs, supra note 28, at 1.
30 See id.
31 See id. at 2.
32 See id.
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Brands competed to provide the "smoothest" tasting cigarette.53 Com-
panies invoked the help of the medical community to lend credence
to their claims. For example, one advertisement read: "Doctors rec-
ommend Camel."3 4 At this time, the extent of the medical dangers of
cigarettes was not fully appreciated.
The 1950s brought compelling evidence that smoking was linked
with health problems, including, in particular, cancer.35 Epidemiolo-
gists studied smoking because they believed it might explain the rock-
eting incidences of lung cancer, once a very rare disease in America.30
These scientists determined that the incidences of lung cancer in-
creased proportionally with the number of packs of cigarettes the pop-
ulation smoked per day.37 As medical information became more
advanced, the tobacco companies became increasingly fearful of
smoker product liability suits and government regulation.38 Given the
steadily increasing amount of information about tobacco use,
[t]he companies had three courses of action open to them, theoret-
ically. They could have accepted the evidence against them as con-
clusive and gone out of business rather than further risldng the
public's health. They could have emphatically denied that their
product was lethal and gone sullenly about their trade. Or they
could have solemnly proclaimed their concern, decried any rush to
judgment, and joined in the study of the problem, hoping that it
would either exonerate their product or isolate the harmful agent.
33 See id.; see also GLA.Arz ET Ai-, supra note 28, at 28.
34 See Hwrs, supra note 28, at 2.
35 One of the earliest studies was completed by Dr. Ernst L. Wynder and Dr. Ev-
arts A. Graham in 1950. See GLANrrz ET AL., supra note 28, at 25. Actually, as early as
1946, chemists employed by tobacco companies started to display concern about to-
bacco use. A letter sent from a Lorillard chemist to the manufacturing committee of
the company reveals this concern. "Certain scientists and medical authorities have
claimed for many years that the use of tobacco contributes to cancer development in
susceptible people. Just enough evidence has been presented tojustify the possibility
of such a presumption." Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 25,
Tex. Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir.
2000) (No. 1:97CV0625).
36 See HILrs, supra note 28, at 3. Lung cancer rose from less than five cases in
100,000 men in 1900 to more than 18,000 cases in 100,000 in 1950. See id. In fact, in
1919 a medical school professor summoned the entire school to view an autopsy of a
man who died of lung cancer, because he believed that they may never get the oppor-
tunity to see one again. See id.
37 See id.
38 While some tobacco executives argued that the best course of action would be
to develop a safer cigarette, ultimately they were persuaded that the existence of a
safer product would open the floodgates of product liability. They decided that pro-
fessed ignorance of a safer alternative would guard against negligence or strict prod.
ucts liability litigation. See Givelber, supra note 28, at 891.
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As prudent men purveying a legal, popular, and highly profitable
product, they elected this third course, promising that if science
could definitively identify a nasty ingredient that indisputably
harmed smokers, their laboratories would remove it forthwith ....
But the cigarette industry did not leave it at that. Instead, it pro-
ceeded during the last half of the 'Fifties to dispute, distort, mini-
mize, or ignore the unfolding evidence against it.3 9
The industry responded to the increasing flood of adverse infor-
mation in a threefold manner. First, low tar and filtered cigarettes
were introduced, giving smokers the false impression that safer alter-
natives existed.40 Second, an inside committee consisting of chief ex-
ecutives of the major tobacco companies, their general counsel,
publicists, and others was created in order to create the appearance of
a unified effort to address the health issues surrounding smoking.
The committee established an industry-wide approach to deception
regarding its product.41 Finally, a massive marketing campaign began
to counteract the increasing amounts of information available to the
public regarding the truth about tobacco. 42 This campaign included
the targeting of youth in marketing efforts.43
B. Low Tar and Filtered Cigarettes
An early tactic of the industry was to market low tar and filtered
brand cigarettes. These cigarettes were not safer than other brands,
although they were packaged and marketed in such a fashion as to
indicate that they were preferable to other kinds of cigarettes. 44 Al-
though reduced tar levels do not make cancer less likely to develop,
tobacco companies began to compete with one another to provide the
lowest tar cigarette. 45 Tobacco executives were aware that filtered and
low-tar cigarettes were not safer products, but supported the produc-
tion and marketing of them in order to ensure the profitability of
their product.46
39 KLUGER, supra note 16, at 205.
40 See infra Part I.B. Ironically, the development and sale of truly safer cigarettes
was suppressed by the industry. See infra Part m.C.
41 See infra Part ll.C.; GiLA.rz Er A., supra note 28, at 32-39.
42 See infra Part II.D.; see also GLATcrz Er At., supra note 28, at 32-39.
43 See infra Part III.E.
44 See GLATZ -r ATL., supra note 28, at 26.
45 This competition is known as the "tar derby." &e id. at 27.
46 Ernest Pepples, Vice President of Brown & Williamson, acknowledged the real-
ity of low tar and filtered cigarette safety in a memorandum. "In most cases... the
smoker of afilter cigarette was getting as much or more nicotine and tar as he would have gotten
from a regular cigarette. He [the smoker] had abandoned the regular cigarette, how-
ever, on the ground of reduced risk to health." Memorandum from Ernest Pepples,
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C. Tobacco Information Research Council
In response to an article published in the December 1953 Cancer
Research Journal,47 the Chief Executive Officers of the five largest to-
bacco companies met on December 15, 1953 at the Plaza Hotel in
New York City to formulate a strategic course of action.48 In response
to the increasing publicity surrounding the link between cancer and
tobacco use, industry leaders hired a public relations firm, Hill &
Knowlton, to orchestrate a unified response to the troubling situa-
tion.49 An internal document of Hill & Knowlton reveals the mood at
the meeting. "[O]fficials stated that salesmen in the industry are fran-
tically alarmed and that the decline in tobacco stocks on the stock
exchange market has caused grave concern ... .",,0 Because the
group agreed that the appearance of a firm stance was crucial, the
Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) was formed in 1954.51
Publicly, the group claimed to be committed to determining whether
the reports linking tobacco use to cancer were valid.5 2 The professed
goals were to research questions of tobacco use and health. The
Council awarded research grants to independent scientists who were
promised complete scientific freedom to conduct their studies.
Grantees alone "are responsible for reporting or publishing their find-
ings in the accepted scientific manner-through medical and scien-
tific journals and societies. 5 3
Vice President of Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation (1976), in GLANTZ ET
AL., supra note 28, at 27 (quoting ERNEsr PFPPLES, INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO TIHE CIGA-
RItTE HEALTH CoNTRovWRs 2 (1976)).
47 See HILTs, supra note 28, at 4.
48 The top executives from American Tobacco, U.S. Tobacco, Benson & Hedges
and Philip Morris were all at the meeting. See id. at 5. RJ. Reynolds, Philip Morris,
Brown & Williamson, American Tobacco, and Benson & Hedges all agreed to the
emergency plan. See id. at 4. The only major tobacco company to refuse to join in the
meeting was Lorillard. See id.
49 See id. at 5-8.
50 Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 28, Tex. Carpenters
Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000) (No.
1:97CV0625).
51 See KLUGER, supra note 16, at 164-69. In 1964 the TIRC changed its name to
the Council for Tobacco Research (CTR). See GLANrz ET AL., supra note 28, at 48. In
1958, cigarette manufacturers created another group known as the Tobacco Institute
(TI). See KLUcER, supra note 16, at 210.
52 See GLANTz ET AL., supra note 28, at 33.
53 Id. at 36 (quoting COUNCIL FOR TOBACCO RESEARCH, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY
STATEMENT (1985)).
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In fact, this group was no more than a public relations facade
that would fool people into thinking that independent research was
being conducted in good faith.- This lawyer-driven group only
sought to create an air of controversy surrounding the carcinogenic
nature of tobacco.5 6 The group knew that it had to maintain igno-
rance about the risks associated with smoking.57 It sought to convey
the belief that cigarettes were as safe as they could possibly be and to
focus attention upon the fact that the public was aware of the dangers
of smoking. To this end, the group engaged in a conspiracy to con-
ceal a great deal of crucial information.58 The actions taken in fur-
therance of the conspiracy, including express fraudulent claims, are
54 In fact, the TIRC was set up one floor below the Hill & Knowlton offices in
New York City and was effectively controlled by the public relations firm. Class Action
Complaint and Demand forjury Trial at 30, Tex Carpenters (No. 1:97CV0625).
55 Actually, lawyers, rather than scientists, often made final decisions on funding.
See GLAN'rz ET At., supra note 28, at 36. Stanton Glantz undertakes a thorough analysis
of the innerworkings of the TIRC. See id. at 35-46.
56 The Hill & Knowlton memorandum that summarized the meeting at the Plaza
Hotel belles the truth of the statements released to the public. The true goal of the
group was clear.
They [the industry] are also emphatic in saying that the entire activity is a
long-term, continuing program, since they feel that the problen is one of pro-
moting cigarettes and protecting tln from these and other altarks that may be ex-
pected in the future.... The current plans are for Hill & Knowlton to serve
as the operating agency of the companies, hiring all staff and disbursing all
funds.
Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 29, Tex Carpenters, (No.
1:97CV0625) (emphasis added).
57 The "tobacco executives grew dependent on lawyers in framing their every
public move and in the sort of research they undertook privately." KLucER, supra
note 16, at 227-28.
58 See Kurzweil v. Philip Morris Co., [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 99,446, at 96,942 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1997) ("The documentary evidence of
internal and industry studies and Philip Morris' manipulation of nicotine was not
capable of discovery before August 1995."); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Florida, 697 So. 2d
1249, 1257 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1997).
The special master found that there was evidence that the defendants hid
from and misrepresented to the public the health risks of smoking and that
their conduct constituted fraud on the public. There was also evidence that
the defendants utilized their attorne)s in carrying out their misrepresenta-
tions and concealment to keep secret research and other conduct related to
the true health dangers of smoking.
Id.; see also Washington v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 96-2-15056-8 SEA, 1997 WL
728262, at *6 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 1997) ("[The] court finds that the state has
made a prima fade showing that R.J. Reynolds was engaged in or mas planning a fraud
at the time the communications were made .... ').
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legion.59 A stunning statistic best expresses the truth about the TIRC
and its aims: "For every dollar spent on its joint research effort in
those early years, the industry spent nearly $200 on advertising and
promoting its product."60
A purported function of the TIRG was to provide funding to
scientists who would research the health effects of tobacco.61 In real-
ity, most of these scientists were focused on issues tangential to the
health impacts of cigarettes. In a survey taken of grantees of TIRC
funds, eighty percent of the scientists admitted that their research was
not focused upon the health effects of smoking.6 2 Rather, the major-
ity of the scientists appears to have been seeking alternative explana-
tions for the information presented by scientists who claimed that
smoking caused cancer.63 Fraudulent studies were sponsored, which
supposedly "tested" the effects of tobacco and not surprisingly "deter-
mined" that a particular brand of cigarettes "would have no adverse
effects on the throat, sinuses or affected organs."64 Additionally,
TIRC expressly instructed many of its grantees to work "off the books"
so that the research would never be made public.65 Grantees whose
work revealed unfavorable information were stripped of their grants
and coerced into removing adverse information from their reports.60
Throughout the years in which the industry banded together to
present a united public relations front, each company was, in fact,
conducting private research into the true nature of cigarettes. Inter-
nal memoranda now available show that the companies' own scientists
came to identical conclusions as those of outside scientists. 67 These
discoveries, kept private, contained reams of information about "nu-
merous compounds that caused cancer and arrays of others which en-
couraged cancer growth."68 "At the very time that the companies were
59 See Clifford E. Douglas, Tobacco Deal Lets the Industy Off the Hook, N.Y. TIMEs,
Feb. 5, 1998, at A22; Clifford E. Douglas, Letter, Tobacco Execs Dance Around Definition
of Addiction, USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 1998, at 12A [hereinafter Douglas, Letter].
60 KLUGER, supra note 16, at 206.
61 See Gt.ANz Er AL., supra note 28, at 36 (quoting COUNCIL FOR TOBACCO Rr-
SEARCH, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY STATEMENT 1 (1985)).
62 See HLTs, supra note 28, at 15.
63 See id. at 10. Among those alternative explanations to the lung cancer epi-
demic were genetics and air pollution. See id. at 15.
64 Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 26, Tex. Carpenters
Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000) (No.
1:97CV0625).
65 See HLrs, supra note 28, at 11.
66 See id.
67 See id. at 15.
68 Id. at 11.
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insisting publicly and in lawsuits that cigarettes are neither addictive
nor carcinogenic, their own research, shielded from the public view,
was establishing the opposite."69 By the 1960s, at least one tobacco
company, Brown & Williamson, had determined through its own labo-
ratory tests that cigarette tar caused cancer in animals.
0
During the time the industry was stifling its own independent re-
search, it was also using its leverage to keep others from publishing
truthful information about the health risks. The TIRC considered li-
bel suits against some researchers, but mainly focused on discrediting
anyone who published information adverse to their product.
71
Under-the-table payments were made to magazine writers who would
publish articles presenting the industry's side of the story.7- This cam-
paign was made possible through the use of the lawyers hired to re-
present the industry in their legal battles.73
D. Keeping the Debate Alive: Public Relations Campaign
The tobacco industry adopted a calculated strategy to create
doubt in the minds of smokers about the safety of cigarettes. The
industry's primary goal was to counter-attack the reports of indepen-
dent scientists by claiming that their research was dishonest and moti-
vated by a desire for increased funding.7 4 First, the industry claimed
no conclusive proof that smoking caused cancer existed.7- This claim
was bolstered by express warranties regarding the healthfulness of to-
bacco. 76 Second, it maintained that smoking was not addictive.77 Fi-
nally, the industry vowed to continue independent research regarding
69 Givelber, supra note 28, at 893.
70 See GLAN'z ET Ar., supra note 28, at 4.
71 See Hars, supra note 28, at 14.
72 Seeid.
73 SeeAm. Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So. 2d 1249, 1257 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1997).
"There was also evidence that the defendants utilized their attorney in carr)ing out
their misrepresentations and concealment to keep secret research and other conduct
related to the true health dangers of smoking." Id. The alleged participation of the
lawyers has been duly noted byjudges. See Sackman v. liggett Group, Inc., 167 F.RD.
6, 18-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 689 (D.N.J.
1992), vacated, 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992) (vacating because the court considered
material outside the record).
74 See HurTS, supra note 28, at 6. An attempt to discredit science generally was also
instituted. The industry claimed that the correlation between smoking and disease
was only statistical, as though that meant that scientists were somehow manipulating
numbers to achieve desired results. See id. at 18.
75 See GLANTZ Er AL., supra note 28, at 2.
76 See infra note 80; see also GLAN.z ET At-, supra note 28, at 3.
77 See infra text accompanying notes 95-100, 160-63.
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the health issues surrounding smoking.78 Hill & Knowlton character-
ized this approach as not purely defensive, but positive and "pro
cigarette."
79
The tobacco industry used popular advertising media to propa-
gate misinformation regarding tobacco use. Magazines, radio, and
television were filled with advertisements aimed at combating increas-
ing amounts of negative medical information.80 In 1954, perhaps the
most famous of the public statements was released in 448 newspapers
across the United States.8 ' This strategic announcement was entitled
"A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers. '8 2 This statement assured
the public that the industry was committed to a thorough and unbi-
ased inquiry into the health concerns raised by researchers.
8 3
Not only did the industry fail to follow its stated agenda, but it
actually worked directly against the health interests of its customers
and the public. Time and again the industry vowed to continue re-
search and present the facts to the public.
We recognize that we have a special responsibility to the public-to
help scientists determine the facts about tobacco and health, and
about certain diseases that have been associated with tobacco use.
We accepted this responsibility in 1954 by establishing the TIRC,
which provides research grants to independent scientists. We
78 See infra note 82; see also HILTs, supra note 28, at 6.
79 Id. at 6.
80 For example, "Not a cough in a Carload," "Not a single case of throat irritation
due to smoking Camels," "The Throat-tested cigarette." Class Action Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial at 26, Tex. Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 1:97CV0625).
81 Interestingly, internal memoranda state that the ad should appear in "no Ne-
gro newspapers." HiLTS, supra note 28, at 12.
82 The advertisement read, in pertinent part:
Recent reports on experiments with mice have given wide publicity to a the-
ory that cigarette smoking is in some way linked with lung cancer in human
beings.... Many people have asked us what we are doing to meet the pub-
lic's concern aroused by the recent reports. Here is the answer: 1. We are
pledging aid and assistance to the research effort into all phases of tobacco
use and health .... 2. For this purpose we are establishing ajoint industry
group consisting initially of the undersigned. This group will be known as
TOBACCO INDUSTRY RESEARCH COMMITrEE. 3. In charge of the re-
search activities of the Committee will be a scientist of unimpeachable integ-
rity and national repute. In addition, there will be an Advisory Board of
scientists disinterested in the cigarette industry .... This statement is being
issued because we believe the people are entitled to know where we stand on
this matter and what we intend to do about it.
GLANrz ET AL., supra note 28, at 34.
83 See id.
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pledge continued support of this program of research until the facts
are known.
84
Advertisements and carefully strategized marketing were not the
only measures taken to dupe the public. Any time a tobacco represen-
tative spoke on the record, he denied that tobacco and smoking were
health risks. Tobacco executives made the following fraudulent
statements:
" "If it is proven that cigarettes are harmful, we want to do something
about it regardless of what somebody else tells us to do. And we
would do our level best. It's only human." 5
" "[T]he cigarette industry is as vitally concerned or more so tha[n]
any other group in determining whether cigarette smoking causes
human diseases.... That is why the entire tobacco industry...
since 1954 has committed a total of $40 million for smoking and
health research through grants to independent scientists and
institutions."
8 6
" "Cigarette smoking has not been scientifically established to be a
cause of chronic diseases, such as cancer, cardiovascular disease, or
emphysema. Nor has it been shown to affect pregnancy outcome
adversely."
8 7
The report of the Scientific Advisory Board of the TIRC also illus-
trated the depths of the deception on the part of the industry. It read,
in pertinent part:
The continued failure of evidence which is qualitatively different or
of increased significance to appear leaves the causation theory of
smoking in lung cancer, heart disease and other ailments without
clinical and experimental proof.... The result is that the tobacco
theory is rapidly losing much of the unique importance claimed by
its adherents at its original announcement08
This report amounted to an outright rejection of a decade's worth of
internal and external research.8 9
84 Class Action Complaint and Demand forJury Trial at 36, Tex. Carpenters (No.
1:97CV0625) (quoting a TIRC/TI advertisement entitled "A Statement about To-
bacco and Health").
85 I& (quoting a 1964 statement by Bowman Gray, R.J. Reynolds' Chairman).
86 I& at 37 (quoting a 1972 statement by Horace Korengay, TI President).
87 Id (quoting a March 1983 statement by Sheldon Summers, MD, Scientific Di-
rector of CTR).
88 KLUGER, supra note 16, at 211 (quoting Scir'nIc ADvtoRY Bouwu, OF THE To.
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III. THE NicoTNN PROBLEM
A main area of concern to the tobacco industry was the issue of
nicotine. Although the industry then maintained that nicotine was
not addictive, medical research, including research done by the com-
panies themselves, belied those claims.90 The properties of nicotine
were isolated and understood in the nineteenth century, long before
any debate arose as to its use in cigarettes.91 Thus, the deception re-
garding nicotine is particularly offensive.
In the tale of cigarettes and lung cancer, we can imagine that the
executives had some hope of escape, and dreamed of making things
all right after cheating for some time. But the tale of nicotine is
different; there is no doubt in their minds. In this story, they aren't
lying in hopes things will get better, they are just lying.
92
The industry's strategy with respect to nicotine was two-fold.
First, in keeping with their previous patterns, public statements were
made denying that nicotine was addictive, and inside research was
suppressed.93 Second, the industry used the research it had gathered
regarding nicotine to manipulate levels in cigarettes in order to con-
tinue to sell them.94
A. Public Statements and Suppression of Research Regarding
Nicotine Addiction
The industry, in particular Philip Morris, employed scientists to
privately study the effects of nicotine on laboratory animals.95 While
publicly claiming that nicotine was not an addictive ingredient in to-
bacco, internal documents written during the same period reveal that
the industry knew the reverse to be true. A recent civil complaint
against Philip Morris cited the following quotations from internal
memoranda of various cigarette companies:
90 See GLAN-rz ET AL., supra note 28, at 15.
91 See Hims, supra note 28, at 42.
92 Id. at 42-43.
93 The addictive properties of nicotine have been known to the tobacco industry
since at least the 1960s. See GLTrrz Er A.., supra note 28, at 58. Tobacco executives,
astonishingly enough, continue to maintain that cigarettes are not addictive. See Bill
Meier, Among Cigarette Makers, Old Habits Die Hard, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1997, at E3.
94 See Lopez-Campillo, supra note 2, at 451.
95 Dr. DeNoble and Dr. Mele were hired by Philip Morris and were instructed to
keep their work secret. In fact, the laboratory animals were delivered early in the
morning so that even other Philip Morris researchers would not know about their
work. See Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 49, Tex. Carpenters
Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000) (No.
1:97CV0625).
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* "Nicotine is not only a very fine drug, but the technique of adminis-
tration by smoking has considerable psychological advantages
"96
° . • ."9
* "A body left in this unbalanced state craves for renewed drug intake
in order to restore the physiological equilibrium. This unconscious
desire explains the addiction of the individual to nicotine."
97
" "Moreover, nicotine is addictive. We are, then, in the business of
selling nicotine, an addictive drug effective in the release of stress
mechanisms."
98
" "We think that most smokers can be considered nicotine seekers,
for the pharmacological effect of nicotine is one of the rewards that
come from smoking. When the smoker quits, he foregoes his accus-
tomed nicotine. The change is very noticeable, he misses the re-
ward, and so he returns to smoking."99
By suppressing research about nicotine, the industry affected
outside research as well-even the Surgeon General's knowledge of
nicotine lagged behind the industry's.100
B. Sales and Nicotine Level Manipulation
Despite protests to the contrary, the tobacco industry was well-
aware that nicotine was the key to cigarette sales. An internal memo-
randum from Philip Morris reveals this understanding: "The cigarette
should be conceived not as a product but as a package. The product
is nicotine.... Think of the cigarette pack as a storage container for a
day's supply of nicotine ... ."101 The industry reconstituted tobacco
in order to provide the smoker with an ever-increasing amount of nic-
96 Id. at 48 (quoting a 1962 statement by Sir Charles Ellis, Scientific Advisor to
British American Tobacco Co., Brown & Williamson's parent company).
97 Id. (quoting a 1963 research report commissioned by Brown & Williamson).
98 I. (quoting a 1963 statement by Addison Yeaman, General Counsel at Brown
& Williamson).
99 Id. (quoting a 1978 report commissioned by Philip Morris).
100 See GLAwrz Er AL, supra note 28, at 15 (showing that the Surgeon General did
not conclude that nicotine was addictive until 1988); see also Insolia v. Philip Morris
Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 600-07 (7th Cir. 2000) (collecting decisions on when danger of
addiction became generally known). "The Surgeon General's seminal 1964 report on
smoking, for instance, said smoking was habituating, but not addictive. The report
compared tobacco to coffee. It was not until 1988 that the Surgeon General declared
smoking addictive, comparing tobacco to cocaine." Id. at 602.
101 Class Action Complaint and Demand forJury Trial at 51, Tex Carpenters (No.
l:97CV0625) (quoting the remarks of William L. Dunn, Jr., a Philip Morris scientist,
in an internal memorandum); see Lopez-Campillo, supra note 2, at 450 (quoting ALfix
M. Freedman, Past is Ominous for Substitute Smokes, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1989, at B1
(quoting William L. Dunn, Jr., Philip Morris research scientist)).
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otine in each cigarette. 102 Clearly, the industry paid careful attention
to nicotine and did not treat it as just an incidental component of the
cigarette.
Given the wealth of information now held by both the public and
the companies, claims that nicotine was not addictive, or that the in-
dustry was unaware of that fact, were dishonest and evasive. In 1994,
DonaldJohnston, C.E.O. of American Tobacco, testified to Congress:
At'no point in the manufacturing process is nicotine content con-
trolled, adjusted or restored to compensate for nicotine lost during
the manufacturing process.... At no time in the new product de-
velopment cycle is nicotine delivery considered as a criteria [sic] for
product design, basically because nicotine delivery follows 'tar' de-
livery and the inventory of tobaccos available for use.1
03
This testimony was completely disingenuous, if not an outright lie:
nicotine levels were, in fact, being manipulated very carefully so that
an increased amount of nicotine could be delivered to the smoker
without compromising the taste of the cigarette.
10 4
Although "choice," "assumption of the risk," and other argumen-
tative slogans have been employed to divert blame to smokers them-
selves, scientific realities about nicotine addiction explain why such
arguments fail. Given that the industry manipulated nicotine levels to
get more smokers hooked on the habit, it is fruitless to argue that
smokers were able to exercise complete free choice with respect to
cigarettes.' 05 Certainly, at least some individuals knew and under-
stood the risks involved in the habit. Nevertheless, the relationship
102 See Hiurs, supra note 28, at 44. For an account of how tobacco is reconstituted,
see id. at 44-45. The use of ammonia compounds in manufacturing increases the
levels of nicotine that are delivered to the smoker. Id. at 169 (quoting 1995 pretrial
deposition testimony of Dr. Jeffrey S. Wigand, Chief of Research for Brown &
Williamson).
103 HiTS, supra note 28, at 43 (quoting Letter from Donald Johnston, Chief Exec-
utive of American Tobacco, to Henry Waxman, Chairman of the Congressional Com-
merce Committee's Subcommittee on Health and the Environment (Oct. 14, 1994)).
104 See id. at 45. The work of Dr. Irby reveals how important nicotine manipula-
tion was to the industry. He suggested two different ways to boost nicotine levels,
The first idea was to add nicotine to the cigarette directly, and the second was to
modify the formula used to make the cigarette. See id. at 44-46. His research was
meticulously executed to enable him to brief the executives on exactly how much of
each type (high or low nicotine quantity) of tobacco would be necessary. See id. at 44.
105 This reality is especially stark with respect to children smokers. See Richard L.
Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play's Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud and Consumer Choice in
"Third Wave" Tobacco Litigation, 46 U. KAN. L. Rxv. 465, 485-89 (1998). Even most
utilitarians and libertarians draw the line of "liberty" at children. See, e.g., H.L.A,
HART, INW, LIBERTY AND MORA=rn 4-6 (1963); infra note 527.
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between understanding that something is unhealthy and becoming
addicted to the use of that product must be distinguished. While
many smokers are able to quit the habit, "the strength of cigarettes'
grip on consumers who have not succeeded in quitting is undeniable.
Although millions of people quit smoking, many millions more have
tried to quit and have failed. Seventeen million smokers attempt to
quit each year; only about 1.3 million per year succeed." 06 They re-
present the core of the industry's consumers. Their "choice" or "as-
sumption of the risk" is illusory.
C. Suppression of Safer Cigarettes
The industry executives with more laudable moral scruples felt
that perhaps the safest alternative given the information they held was
to manufacture a safer cigarette. 10 7 Unfortunately, these executives
were eventually convinced that to start production and sale of a safer
cigarette would mean the destruction of their business. Once the in-
dustry admitted that the product was unreasonably dangerous, the
proverbial house of cards would collapse, and the industry would be
subject to countless lawsuits.
Any incentive to creating a safer cigarette ran directly contrary to
the best interest of the tobacco industry. As Daniel Givelber points
out:
Rather than the negligence regime creating incentives towards
safety, it produced the opposite result. The tobacco companies
never explicitly competed in terms of safety. Indeed, they assidu-
ously avoided mentioning safety in their marketing and failed to
conduct meaningful research into safer ways of making cigarettes.
Astonishingly, they put lawyers rather than scientists or manufactur-
ing executives in charge of the research that was conducted, and
they withheld dissemination of the results of that research as privi-
leged legal work product. Collusion, not competition, ensured that
the companies neither discussed the relative safety of the %arious
brands nor worked strenuously to bring to market a demonstrably
safer product.10
8
Several tobacco companies researched the development of safer
cigarettes during the same time they were maintaining that cigarettes
were not health risks.' 0 9 Five companies both designed and tested
106 Cupp, supra note 105, at 484-85.
107 See GLaNcz ET AT., supra note 28, at 108; Hi='s, supra note 28, at 57.
108 Givelber, supra note 28, at 888.
109 See GL E IT Al., supra note 28, at 109.
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safer cigarettes, one of which had a filter to absorb the carcinogens.1 0
These research efforts were not made public."'
Safer cigarette production was recognized as a "real problem" for
the tobacco industry." 2 If a safer cigarette were produced, it would
call into doubt not only the safety of existing cigarettes, but also the
previous warranties that cigarettes were produced in the safest man-
ner possible. A Philip Morris internal memorandum reveals the con-
cern of that company to the introduction of safer cigarettes: "We have
reason to believe that in spite of the gentlemans [sic] agreement for
the tobacco industry in previous years that at least some of the major
companies have been increasing biological studies with their own fa-
cilities."" 3 This deviation from the agreed course of action was, of
course, problematic for the industry.
D. Marketing and Sales to Minors
The most reprehensible aspect of the tobacco industry's conduct
was the deliberate marketing of its deadly product to children.114 The
industry recognized the need to lure smokers at an early age, given
the addictive nature of its product. Efforts to attract a young market
succeeded." 5 Eighty-two percent of smokers in America started smok-
ing before the age of eighteen, sixty-two percent began smoking
before they were sixteen, and thirty-eight percent began smoldng
before they were fourteen.1 6 A study conducted by the National Insti-
tute of Drug Abuse found that in the years between 1991 and 1994 the
110 See HILTs, supra note 28, at 39.
111 See id.
112 See GLA=w zr AL., supra note 28, at 440.
113 See Class Action Complaint and Demand for jury Trial at 38, Tex. Carpenters
Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000) (No.
1:97CV0625) (quoting a 1968 statement of the Vice President of Research and Devel-
opment at Philip Morris).
114 See generally Robert Adler, Here's Smoking at You, Kid: Has Tobacco Product Place
ment in the Movies Really Stopped?, 60 MoNT. L. REv. 243 (1999) (discussing cigarette
advertising and product placement targeting young adults).
115 For an analysis of how advertisement affects teen smoking, see Kathleen M.
Paralusz, Ashes to Ashes: Why FDA Regulation of Tobacco Advertising May Mark the End of
the Road for the Marlboro Man, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 89, 91-98 (1998). See also Patricia A.
Davidson, Tales from the Tobacco Wars: Industry Advertising Targets Teenage Girls, 13 Wis.
WoMEN's LJ. 1, 1-16 (1998) (detailing efforts to target not only the youth market
smokers generally, but young women in particular).
116 See Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 61, Tex. Carpenters
(No. 1:97CV0625).
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increase in smoking rates was highest among eighth graders, up thirty
percent.
17
The marketing efforts directed at youth, most notably the Marl-
boro Man andJoe Camel, were strategic ploys at capturing new smok-
ers," 8 since nicotine addiction typically does not develop in adults.'1 9
Among persons who start smoking after the age of 21, ninety percent
quit the habit completely within a relatively short time.120 However, it
usually takes at least one year to become addicted to nicotine. 21 If
the industry did not target young smokers, "the entire industry would
collapse within a single generation."1 22
Tobacco companies were acutely aware that most of their custom-
ers began smoking by age nineteen. 12 3 Three quarters of those young
smokers began smoking by age seventeen.' 2 4 Marketing and advertis-
ing efforts to this age group were crucial to the livelihood of the in-
dustry. It needed to attract smokers by making smoking appealing,
and it needed to maintain those smokers by delivering enough nico-
tine to get, and keep, them addicted.' The claim that the industry
did not know its product was addictive is contradicted by every strate-
gic maneuver made from the industry's inception.
After the Surgeon General's report 126 was released, the indus-
try announced that it was instituting a code of marketing. 2 7 A
public enforcer was selected and given the power to levy fines, if a
company targeted children in its advertising. 2 8 Unfortunately, no
fines were ever actually imposed, and the administrators even-
tually resigned from their positions.12 9 The codes were promptly
117 See id. at 62.
118 See generally Mary B. Meaden, CoxmnentJoe Camel and tle Targeting of Minors in
Tobacco Advertising. Before and After 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 31 NTEv E.cN. L.
REv. 1011 (1997) (giving an in-depth discussion of the marketing of tobacco to
children).






125 See generally Clay Calver, Excising Media Images to Solve Societal Ills: Communication,
Media Effects, Social Science, and the Regulation of Tobacco Advertising, 27 SY U. L RE-
401 (1998) (discussing cultural and societal effects of cigarette advertising uith re-
spect to behavior and attitudes).
126 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUtmAN SERs., SioKiN AND HEALTH, A REroTr OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL (1979).
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"scuttled." 30 The industry continued to place its greatest marketing
emphasis on youth. Claude Teague, R.J. Reynolds' assistant chief in
Research and Development, for example, worked shamefully on de-
veloping a cigarette to appeal to beginning smokers. His reports in-
clude the following statements:
" "Happily for the tobacco industry,... nicotine is both habituating
and unique in its variety of physiological actions .... 131
" "[The smoker] appears to start to smoke for purely psychological
reasons-to emulate a valued image, to conform, to experiment, to
defy, to be daring, to have something to [do] with his hands, and
the like .... This leaves us, then, in the position of attempting to
design and promote the same product to two different types of mar-
ket with two different sets of motivations, needs and
expectations.' 3
2
" "Realistically,... if our company is to survive and prosper, over the
long term we must get our share of the youth market .... Thus we
need new brands designed to be particularly attractive to the young
smoker, while ideally at the same time being appealing to all
smokers."13
3
* "Thus, a new brand aimed at the young smoker must somehow be-
come the 'in' brand and its promotion should emphasize together-
ness, belonging and group acceptance, while at the same time
emphasizing individuality and 'doing one's own thing.'"'S4
The result of Dr. Teague's suggestions was the infamous Joe
Camel, the "smooth character;" an appealing cartoon character who
smoked cigarettes.135 R.J. Reynolds was not the first or only company
to develop a recognizable character to peddle cigarettes. Philip Mor-
ris launched Marlboro Man after years of research into the male youth
market and found him outstandingly successful.' 3 6 Creator, Jack Lan-
dry, proclaimed the commercials "would turn rookie smokers on to
Marlboro ... the right image to capture the youth market's fancy... a
perfect symbol of independence and individualistic rebellion." 13 7 In-
deed, the Marlboro Man did hisjob. Explained one executive: "When
you see teenage boys-people the cigarette companies aren't sup-
130 Id.
131 Id. at 72 (quoting Memorandum of Claude Teague (Apr. 14, 1972)).
132 Id. at 73 (quoting Memorandum of Claude Teague (Apr. 14, 1972)).
133 Id. at 74 (quoting Memorandum of Claude Teague (Apr. 14, 1972)).
134 Id. at 75 (quoting Memorandum of Claude Teague (Apr. 14, 1972)).
135 See id. at 70.
136 See id. at 66-67.
137 Id. (quoting the statement of Jack Landry, Philip Morris Ad Executive, to an
undisclosed writer).
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posed to be targeting in the first place-going crazy for this guy, you
know they're hitting their target." 38 Before long, Marlboro had cap-
tured a larger share of starters than any other cigarette and was the
leading cigarette sold in the country. 3 9
Marketing was not the only method used to attract young smok-
ers. Product placement was also an important aspect of the industry's
approach. Cigarette promotions appeared far more often in stores
located near schools.' 4° They often appeared at a height of three feet
or lower.' 4' In spite of these calculated efforts to appeal to young
smokers, the industry continued to claim that it was not encouraging
young people to smoke.142 As late as 1990, R.J. Reynolds' Division
Manager for Florida Sales asked R.J. Reynolds sales representatives to
identify the stores in their area that were closest in proximity to high
schools and colleges. 43 These accounts were then given particular
attention.'4 One of the company's affiliates undertook a "Youth Tar-
get" study with the purpose of"provid[ing] marketers and policy mak-
ers with an enriched understanding of the mores and motives of this
important emerging adult segment which can be applied to better de-
cision making in regard to products and programs directed at
youth." 45 The industry maintained, however, that advertising and
marketing efforts were merely aimed at achieving customer brand loy-
alty and not to encourage young people to pick up smoking. 4G Nev-
138 Id. at 67 (quoting an unnamed executive who worked on Marlboro).
139 See id.
140 See id. at 93.
141 See id. at 97. This effort was directed at capturing the Young Adult Segment or
YAS. According to an RJR salesman, "If you got a high school on a block, and at the
end of the block you got a Seven-11, that's one YAS outlet. The criteria you would use
was simple. The stores were the ones where the kids hang out." Id. at 97 (quoting
Mike Shaw, a former RJR Salesman, during an interview with Philip Hilts regarding
the Young Adult Segment). Another salesman, Terence Sullian, related a chilling
exchange: "Someone asked exactly who the young people were that were being
targeted, junior high school kids, or even younger? The reply came back 'They got
lips? We want 'em.'" Id. at 98 (quoting Terence Sullivan, an RJR Sales Representative,
describing a regional sales meeting during an interview with Philip Hilts).
142 See Class Action Complaint and Demand forJury Trial at 63, Tex. Carpenters
Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000) (No.
1:97CV0625).
143 See HiL-s, supra note 28, at 96.
144 See id. at 97; see also Class Action Complaint and Demand forJury Trial at 63,
Tex Carpenters (No. 1:97CV0625).
145 Class Action Complaint and Demand forJury Trial at 64, T= Carpnters (No.
1:97CV0625).
146 See id. at 63.
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ertheless, industry documents and testimonies before Congress 147
contradict these claims.
E. Continuing Conspiracy
The pattern evident in the above commentary continued. The
medical and scientific communities persisted in researching the
health risks of smoking, 48 and the industry continued to launch
counter-active marketing ploys to divert attention away from the truth,
all the while sitting on the research that was conclusive-that ciga-
rettes are indeed carcinogenic and addictive. 149 By 1964, strong evi-
dence about the nature of cigarettes had accumulated, but the
industry stayed on its originally plotted course.150 This led to count-
less cover-ups, the closing of research laboratories, as well as increased
security at factories, including keeping some areas of the operations
secret.15'
For decades, smokers unsuccessfully sued the tobacco industry
for health problems caused by cigarette smoking. 5 2 Documents from
these cases were not made public. In 1988 Judge H. Lee Sarokin in
the NewJersey District Court 53 read the "tobacco papers." Although
they remained sealed, the judge's words revealed much about their
content. He noted:
Ajury might reasonably conclude that the industry's announcement
of proposed independent research into the dangers of smoking and
its promise to disclose its findings was nothing but a public relations
ploy -a fraud-to deflect the growing evidence against the indus-
try, to encourage smokers to continue and non-smokers to begin,
147 In testifying before Congress, the model who played the "Winston [sic] [Marl-
boro] Man" explained,
I was clearly told that young people were the market that we were going
after .... [I]t was made clear to us that this image was important because
kids like to role play, and we were to provide the attractive role models for
them to follow .... I was told I was a live version of the GI Joe ....
Id. at 64.
148 See GLArz ET AL., supra note 28, at 56.
149 See HILTs, supra note 28, at 25-39.
150 See Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 427-28 (Tex. 1997) ("[The]
industry continues to dispute the health risks of smoking and the addictive nature of
cigarettes, before Congress, in the national press, and even at the oral argument
before the Court in this case."(footnotes omitted)).
151 See HILrs, supra note 28, at 20.
152 See id.
153 See id. at 21; Haines v. Liggett Group, 140 F.R.D. 681, 684 (D.N.J. 1992), va-
cated, 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992).
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and to reassure the public that adverse information would be
disclosed.
15 4
In 1994, the levee broke when thousands of pages of internal doc-
uments from Brown & Williamson were made public.'r They were
first published, in part, in the New York Tirnes.15 6 These documents
revealed many of the missing pieces about the conduct of the tobacco
industry during the time in which the controversy about tobacco use
was alive. 157 The availability of this information opened up the possi-
bility of the litigation that followed, most notably the suits by the attor-
neys general of forty states against the industry.158 One confidential
internal memorandum documenting the tobacco industry's strategy
speaks volumes:
For nearly twenty years, this industry has employed a single strategy
to defend itself on three major fronts-litigation, politics, and pub-
lic opinion.
While the strategy was brilliantly conceived and executed over the
years, helping us win important battles, it is only fair to say that it is
not-nor was it ever intended to be-a vehicle for victory. On the
contrary, it has always been a holding strategy, consisting of
-creating doubt about the health charge without actually denying
it
-advocating the public's right to smoke, without actually urging
them to take up the practice
154 Haines, 140 F.R.D. at 684.
155 See GLAN'rz ET AT., supra note 28, at 2. The documents were obtained by a
paralegal, Merrell Williams, who copied them before being fired from the company.
Brown & Williamson subsequently sued Williams unsuccessfully to enjoin the release
of the papers. See The Brown & Williamson Documents: Miere Do We Go From Here?, 274
JAMA 256, 256 (1995). Many of the documents were marked "confidential" or "attor-
ney work product," which suggested that the authors never expected them to be re-
leased outside the corporation, even for legal proceedings. &e id. These documents
demonstrate that the tobacco industry in general, and Browm & Williamson in particu-
lar, engaged in public deception for at least thirty years. Sce id. To view these docu-
ments in their entirety, see Tobacco Control Ardkes, at http:// v.libmry.ucsf.edu/
tobacco (last modified Aug. 29, 2000).
156 See Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Company was Silent on Hazard, N.Y. T~vss, May 7,
1994, at Al.
157 Efforts to have these documents sealed were quashed. Judge Harold H.
Greene of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia remarked that the at-
tempt to shield the documents from the public was "patently crafted to harass those
who would reveal facts concerning [Brown & Williamson's] knowledge of the health
hazards inherent in tobacco." Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406, 416 (D.D.C.
1994), afd, 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
158 See generally Givelber, supra note 28 (discussing the history of products liability
suits against the tobacco industry).
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-encouraging objective scientific research as the only way to re-
solve the question of the health hazard.' 5 9
The tobacco industry continued to take measures to conceal the
information it had possessed for decades. As recently as 1998, tobacco
representatives appeared before Congress and would only admit that
"nicotine is addictive 'under certain definitions"' and would not con-
cur with the Surgeon General's or the World Health Organization's
definitions.
60
Testifying under oath before Congress, the C.E.O. of RJ. Reyn-
olds stated, "Smoking is no more addictive than coffee, tea or
Twinkies."' 6' The C.E.O. of Brown & Williamson testified, "I do not
believe that nicotine is addictive" 62 and "nicotine is a very important
constituent in the cigarette smoke for taste."' 63
F. The Result
The tobacco industry's public relations campaign was one of the
most successful in history. In the face of mounds of scientific data, the
industry succeeded in keeping a kernel of doubt regarding cigarettes'
effects on health in the minds of the public.'64 Although it took sev-
eral decades to uncover, as a result of the publication of the industry's
internal documents, the truth is out.' 65 Countless individuals sued
the industry unsuccessfully;' 66 however, recently several states have
159 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence
of Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1420, 1488 (1999) (quoting Memorandum
from Fred Panzer, Vice President of Public Relations, Tobacco Institute, to Horace R.
Kornegay, President, Tobacco Institute (May 1, 1972)).
160 Douglas, Letter, supra note 59, at 12A.
161 Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part I): Hearings Concerning Whether the Food and
Drug Admin. Has Jurisdiction to Regulate and Therefore Ban Cigarettes Before the House
Health & Env't Subcomm., Energy & Commerce Comm., 103d Cong. 579 (1994) (state-
ment ofJames W.Jobuson, C.E.O., R.J. Reynolds Co.); see alsoJohn Freeman, Standing
Up to the Client, S.C. LAW., Mar./Apr. 1999, at 10.
162 Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part III): Hearings Before the House Health & Env't
Subcomm., Energy & Commerce Comm., 103d Cong. 139 (1994) (statement of Thomas
Sandefur, C.E.O., Brown & Williamson).
163 Id. at 144.
164 For a discussion of the behavior of consumers with respect to the realities of
the dangers of smoking, see Pauline M. Ippolito & Richard A. Ippolito, Measuring the
Value of Life Saving from Consumer Reactions to New Information, 25 J. PUB. EcoN. 53, 62
(1984).
165 For an excellent account of the content of the tobacco industry's internal doc-
uments, see Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota
Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 477, 519-66 (1999).
166 For a history of the tobacco litigation starting in the 1950s, see Ingrid L.
Dietsch Field, Comment, No Ifs, Ands, or Butts: Big Tobacco is Fighting for its Life Against
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challenged the balance of the litigation with the force of government
and armed with more information about both tobacco and the to-
bacco industry. These states sued the industry and obtained a settle-
ment of $246 billion, to be paid over twenty-five years, to reimburse
the states for the costs of treating their citizens for tobacco-related
illnesses.' 67 President Clinton approved FDA regulations, stating "Joe
Camel and the Marlboro Man will be out of our children's reach for-
ever."168 Congress debated, but failed to enact comprehensive legisla-
tion. During the Senate debate, 169 the Gregg Amendment was
adopted; it denied immunity to the industry in suits by health care
payers.' 70 Ultimately, the legislation failed to pass.171
Despite the wealth of information now available concerning the
tobacco industry's efforts to deceive the public, plaintiffs suing to-
bacco companies still have to prove that the fraud perpetrated by the
industry caused their illnesses. Federal courts of appeals have consist-
ently held that the tobacco industry's fraud did not constitute the
a New Breed of Plaintiffs Armed with Mounting Evidence, 27 U. B ALT. L REV. 99, 100-06
(1997). See also Anna Burdeshaw Fretvell, Note, Clearing the Air: An Argument for a
Federal Cause ofAction to Provide an Adequate Retwdy for Smoers Injured iy Tobacco Compa-
nies, 31 GA. L. REv. 929, 933-64 (1997) (discussing the various causes of action and
describing litigation against the tobacco industry).
167 See Marc Lacey, Tobacco Industry Accused of Fraud in Lawsuit by U.S., N.Y. TIusEs,
Sept. 23, 1999, at Al (reporting federal racketeering suit by government to recover
moneys not included in states' $246 billion settlement); Henry Weinstein, Big Tobacco
Settles Minnesota Lawsuit for 6.6 Billion, LA. TmEs, May 9, 1998, at Al (reporting last
minute settlement in the State of Minnesota's case against Philip Morris); see also John
Swartz, Cigarette Makers Settle lorida Suit for $11.3 Billion, WAsH. Posr, Aug. 26, 1997, at
Al (reporting the terms of the Florida settlement); Saundra Tony and Ceci Connolly,
Tobacco Frmns Set to Pay Texas $14.5 Billion; Deal Would Be Fourth by Industry Since Summer,
WASH. Posr, Jan. 16, 1998, at Al (reporting then-pending Texas settlement as the
largest in history).
168 Stephen Barr & Martha M. Hamilton, Clinton Curtails Tobacco Ads in Bid to Cut
Sales; WASH. PoSr, Aug. 24, 1996, at Al. But see Food and Drug Admin. %. Browna &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000) (holding that tobacco regulation
was beyond the authority of the FDA).
169 See 144 CONG. RE. 2809-11 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1998) (statements of Senators
Domenici, Enzi, Hatch, Dodd, and Lautenberg).
170 See Gregg Amendment, S. Con. Res. 86, 105th Cong., 144 CoNG. Ruc. 2811
(1998) (enacted) (rejecting a cap on damage recovery from the industry).
171 The industry objected to the McCain sponsored bill, because it would have
raised the price of cigarettes by $1.10 per pack. See David E. Rosenbaum, Senate Drops
Tobacco Bill with '98 Revival Unlikely: Clinton Lashes Out at G.O.P., N.Y. TIE, June 18,
1998, at Al. The industry quickly perceived that this would compromise their profits
and launched a campaign against it. See id. After the bill failed to pass, the industry
raised the price of cigarettes by $0.45 per pack. See Barry Meier, Cigarette Ma!:ers An-
nounce Large Price Rise N.Y. Tims, Nov. 24, 1998, at A20.
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proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. The circuit courts, however,
have engaged in an improper analysis of proximate cause, as Part VI
of this Note will show. To appreciate how the circuit courts have mis-
applied the law of proximate cause, an understanding of the history
and current Supreme Court treatment of proximate cause and re-
moteness is necessary.
IV. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PROXIMATE CAUSE
The historical development of liability and causation is useful to
cast light on proximate cause. "In a philosophical sense, the conse-
quences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go
back to the dawn of human events, and beyond."1 72 Holding an actor
responsible for the entire logical extension of his conduct is impossi-
ble. Jurists must determine, therefore, how to decide when an action
is too far removed from its result to find liability. This question has
puzzled legal scholars for almost a century.
173
The term "proximate cause" originated in the nineteenth cen-
tury.174 It was the first legal metaphor used to explain objective causa-
tion.1 75  Nevertheless, the roots of the issue-and its policy
justification-run deeper.176 Lord Bacon is credited with the famous
formulation: "In jure non remota causa, sed proxima spectatur" ("In law,
look to the proximate, not remote cause"). 177 This distinction and its
172 WnLAM L. PROSSER & ROBERT E. KEETON, PROSSER AND ICEETON ON TtiE LAW Or
TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984).
173 "There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth
more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion."
Id. at 263; see also LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 135-36 (1927).
"Cause," although irreducible in its concept, could not escape the ruffles
and decorations so generously bestowed: remote, proximate, direct, immedi-
ate, adequate, efficient, operative, inducing, moving, active, real, effective,
decisive, supervening, primary, original, contributory, ultimate, concurrent,
causa causans, legal, responsible, dominating, natural, probable, and others.
The difficulty now is in getting any one to believe that so simple a creature
could have been so extravagantly garbed.
Id.
174 SeeMortonJ. Horwitz, The Rise and Early Progressive Critique of Objective Causation,




177 7 FRANcIs BAcON,'M46irs of the Law, in THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 327, 327
(J. Spedding et al. eds., London, Longman & Co. 1879).
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relationship to the law were memorialized in Bacon's Maxims of the
Law.
178
[Taken literally, [Bacon's phrase] would mean that only the ante-
cedent which is nearest in time or space is to be regarded as the
legal cause, and no other will be held responsible. Whether Bacon
really meant anything of the sort is at least doubtful. If he did, the
courts have long since ceased to pay attention to him.
179
Bacon's formulation is decidedly at the root of many of the mis-
conceptions about "proximate cause" in tort litigation.180 The phrase
is problematic since it apparently refers only to nearness in time,
whereas decisions of whether or not to hold a defendant accountable
almost always involve more considerations than physical proximity to
the damage. 181 The phrase also fails to take into account the reality of
the extra elements involved in these determinations. In fact,
"'[p]roximate cause' . . . is merely the limitation which the courts
have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of
the actor's conduct."18 2 How to classify these other considerations is
continually the focal point of the "proximate cause" debate.
In the nineteenth century, the law turned away from subjective,
policy-based theories of determining proximate cause.1as Legal writ-
ers strove to identify a manner in which judges and juries could pro-
duce uniform results.'84 "At the conceptual center of all late-
nineteenth-century efforts to construct a system of private lav free
from the dangers of redistribution was the idea of objective causa-
tion."185 The writers sought to legitimize the legal system as a whole
by ensuring that a fact-finder could look "objectively" to the cause of
an injury and restore the status quo. 18 6 Nevertheless, the chief policy
concern was the proper identification of the defendant. 87 If an "ob-
178 See iU
179 PRoss-R & KEETON, supra note 172, § 42, at 276.
180 According to H.LA. Hart and Tony HonorS, "Causation in law is less a concept
to be analysed than a ghost to be exorcised." H.LA. HART & To.,T HoW, GQusA.
TION IN THE LAw 3 (2d ed. 1985).
181 Prosser and Keeton view the term "proximate cause" as extremely trouble-
some. "It is an unfortunate word, which places an entirely wrrong emphasis upon the
factor of physical or mechanical closeness. For this reason 'legal cause' or perhaps
even 'responsible cause' would be a more appropriate term." PROSsER & KEEroN,
supra note 172, § 42, at 273.
182 I. § 41, at 264.
183 See Hotritz, supra note 174, at 479.
184 See id. at 478-79.
185 Id. at 478.
186 Id. at 479.
187 See id
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jective" formula could not be achieved and "[i]f the question of which
of several acts caused the plaintiff's injury was open to judicial discre-
tion,... private law [could not] stay clear of the dangers of the politi-
cal uses of law for purposes of redistribution.... 188 That effort, of
course, failed; its story is worth reviewing.
A. Chains of Causation
Proponents of the chain of causation theory believed it "necessary
to find a single scientific cause and thus a single responsible defen-
dant, for any acknowledgment of multiple causation would open the
floodgates of judicial discretion."'8 9 This theory held that 'Judges
could determine scientifically which acts in a complicated series of
events really caused the plaintiff's injury."190 The scientific chain-of-
causation framework proved complicated and unworkable. Writers at-
tacked this system and proposed different solutions.191 Doctrines of
intervening and supervening causes, which will be discussed later in
this Note,192 were natural outgrowths of the chain-of-causation the-
ory.'93 They remain part of the law today.
B. Moral Culpability
Notions of moral culpability provide another method to distin-
guish those defendants who should and those defendants who should
not be held accountable. This theory is premised on the belief that
moral culpability, when combined with "but for" causation, points to
an appropriate sanction.' 94 It provides that "in assessing responsibil-
ity, the degree of moral blameworthiness may properly be a control-
ling factor in deciding whether an actor is legally responsible for harm
of which his act was a necessary condition." 195 The theory is "inspired
by the belief that the obscurities of proximate cause may be avoided if
determinations of the extent of liability for wrongdoing which are at
present discussed in causal terms are treated as judgments about the
social utility or justice of exacting compensation.... " 196 This line of




191 See id. at 490-93.
192 See infra text accompanying notes 251-55.
193 See Horwitz, supra note 174, at 479.
194 See HART & HONORE, supra note 180, at 301.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 299.
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an act is illegal, but not thought to be per se morally wrong. Discern-
ing whose notions of moral opprobrium should be taken into consid-
eration presents problems in a pluralistic society.
H.LA- Hart and Tony Honord argue that moral culpability the-
ory is "intended not merely to give an account of the actual behavior
of courts .. .but to offer rational bases of responsibility."197 They
therefore criticize moral theory, because
this theory has no plausibility as an account of what lawyers or ordi-
nary men understand by causing harm, nor would it be tolerable as
a method for assessing responsibility. In the former role it fails be-
cause it allows no place for the use of causal language in determin-
ing whether contingencies other than human acts are the cause of
harm, and because it distorts the relation of causation to moral
blame .... Because our judgments of moral responsibility are
powerfully influenced by causation in a sense.., the latter also fails
as a satisfactory basis for legal responsibility and a substitute for or-
dinary causal principles. 1
98
While it is true that notions of morality guide courts' decisions on
causation, a principle that articulates these realities is yet to be
developed.
C. Foreseeability
Some philosophers spoke of "proximate cause" in terms of fore-
seeability.19 9 They believed the "proximate cause" decision should
turn on whether the result was, or should have been, foreseeable by
the actor.200 This test seems, at first glance, to be a sound guiding
principle because holding the actor accountable for consequences
that are foreseeable seems fair. Thus, the system would not be subject
to the whim or caprice of an individual judge, and defendants would
be able to anticipate consistent results. Ironically, the foreseeability
theory proved to be more complex than originally foreseen.
The debate began in 1850, by Baron Pollock, who first articulated
the idea that foreseeability and degree of the risk of harm should gov-
ern the extent of liability in negligence cases. "[N]o defendant
should ever be held liable for consequences which no reasonable per-
son would expect to follow from the conduct."
20
197 Id. at 301.
198 Id. at 301-02.
199 See Horwitz, supra note 174, at 484-87.
200 See id.
201 PROssER & KEETON, supra note 172, § 43, at 281.
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Nevertheless, others would hold a defendant liable "for conse-
quences brought about by [his] acts, even though they were not rea-
sonably to be anticipated."20 2 This theory was first seen in an 1870
English case, Smith v. London & Southwestern Railway Co. 20 3 This view
on liability is much more expansive than limiting liability to that
which a reasonable person might foresee. It provides that defendants
owe a duty to others beyond which a reasonable person might think
was "foreseeable."20 4 Judge Andrews expanded upon this formulation
in his dissent in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.205 and argued that
a far-reaching duty was owed by all people to one another.206 This
view has been largely dismissed.
Hart and Honor6 rejected the foreseeability test as a substitution
for causation. "[T]he principal form of the claim that policy domi-
nates this branch of the law consists in an appeal to foreseeability or
risk as the exclusive or at least the main test."20 7 They explained, how-
ever, that "[a] reading of many cases on 'proximate cause' or 'remote-
ness of damage' leaves on the mind a strong impression of the
number and variety of references to foreseeability to be found in [pol-
icy] judgments, even when they professedly treat of causal
problems."2
08
Francis Wharton also rejected a foreseeability standard and in-
stead placed emphasis on divorcing legal and scientific causation. He
offered a formulation that held: "If the consequence flows from any
particular negligence according to ordinary natural sequence, without
the intervention of any independent human agency, then such conse-
quence, whether foreseen as probable or unforeseen, is imputable to
the negligence."20 9 This formulation is commonly thought to be the
"orthodox view of objective causation that would continue to domi-
nate late-iineteenth-century legal thought."210
D. The Backlash
The attempt to fashion a set of rules that would govern proximate
cause determinations was, Hart and HonorC argued, misguided.
202 Id. § 43, at 290.
203 5 L.R.-C.P. 98 (1870).
204 See id. at 679-80.
205 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
206 See id. at 103.
207 HART & HONORP, supra note 180, at 254.
208 Id.
209 Horwitz, supra note 174, at 484 (quoting F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LOW
OF NEGLGENCE § 138 (2d ed. 1878)).
210 Id. at 484-85.
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Efforts to lay down, even for separate branches of the law, or even
for a specificjurisdiction, general rules defining causal connection,
or "proximate cause," or determining when harm is too "remote" to
be attributed to antecedent wrongdoing as its consequence, are, on
some variants of this view, all misguided. They are useless because
they are inevitably couched in language so vague as to permit courts
to attach any meaning they wish to them. Worse they disguise as a
finding of fact, albeit a peculiarly recondite kind of fact, the often
creative function which the courts discharge when they determine
in concrete cases the proper limits of scope of general rules. All
such rules are a deception and a cheat, encouraging a superstition
and blinding us to the nature of an important judicial duty.
21 1
The chief architect of the preferred policy-based formulation uras
Nicholas St. John Green. Green explained, "Where a court says the
damage is remote, it does not follow naturally, it is not proximate, all
they mean and can mean is that they think that in all circumstances
the plaintiff should not recover."21 2 Green's position was based on the
idea that, because "judges and jurists inevitably imported moral ideas
into their determinations of legal causation, they were making discre-
tionary policy determinations under the guise of doing science."2 13
He believed that identifying a single "proximate cause" was practically
impossible. 214 Instead, he took a more philosophical stance saying,
211 HART & HoNoP-, supra note 180, at 4.
212 Id. at 5 (quoting Nicholas St. John Green from 1874).
213 Horwitz, supra note 174, at 481.
214 Green believed that objective causation isas possible in the physical sciences,
but was not a viable paradigm for a legal system. See id. at 480. Famously, Green
wrote:
There is but one view of causation which can be of practical serice. To
every event there are certain antecedents, never a single antecedent, but al-
ways a set of antecedents, which being given the effect is sure to follow, un-
less some new thing intervenes to frustrate such result. It is not any one of
this set of antecedents taken by itself which is the cause. No one by itself
would produce the effect. The true cause is the whole set of antecedents,
taken together.... But when a cause is to be investigated for any practical
purpose, the antecedent which is within the scope of that purpose is singled
out and called the cause, to the neglect of the antecedents which are of no
importance to the matter in hand. These last antecedents, if mentioned at
all in the inquiry, are called conditions. Suppose a man to have been
drowned. What was the cause of his death? There must have been a man,
and there must have been water, and there must have been a coming to-
gether of the man and the water under certain circumstances. The fact of
there being a man, and the fact of there being water, and each and every
attending circumstance, without the presence of which circumstance the
death would not have taken place, together with the fact that there vs noth-
ing intervening to prevent, constitute the true cause.
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"To every event there are certain antecedents .... It is not any one of
this set of antecedents taken by itself which is the cause. No one by
itself would produce the effect. The true cause is the whole set of
antecedents taken together."215 Green also pointed out the reality
that the Supreme Court's current analysis admits of today-that proxi-
mate cause is truly a policy-based notion. He believed courts manipu-
lated their usage of the terms "proximate" and "remote" to
accomplish purposes other than determining causation in a strict
sense. 216 He explained that having one rule for determining causa-
tion was inadvisable because, when courts decide causation issues, the
"answer" "often var[ies] in proportion to the misconduct, reckless-
ness, or wantonness of the defendant."2 17 Hart and Honor6 echoed
this idea.
The causal language used by the courts in determining such issues,
unsatisfactory as it often is, has seldom been a mere disguise for
judgments of policy or expediency or judicial intuitions of what is
just; though since the causal notions latent in ordinary thought, like
all other fundamental concepts, have aspects which are vague and
indeterminate, decisions involving them outside the central area of
simple cases have been powerfully and properly influenced byjudi-
cial conceptions of policy or justice.
2 18
What one of the various circumstances necessary to the death we shall single
out as the cause, to the neglect of the other circumstances, depends upon
the question for what purpose we are investigating the death. For each dif-
ferent purpose with which we investigate we shall find a different circum-
stance, which we shall then intelligibly and properly call the cause. The man
may have committed suicide; we say he himself was the cause of his death.
He may have been pushed into the water by another; we say that other per-
son was the cause. The drowned man may have been blind, and have fallen
in while his attendant'was wrongfully absent; we say the negligence of his
attendant was the cause. Suppose him to have been drowned at a ford which
was unexpectedly swollen by rain; we may properly say that the height of the
water was the cause of his death. A medical man may say that the cause of
his death was suffocation by water entering the lungs. A comparative anato-
mist may say that the cause of his death was the fact that he had lungs in-
stead of gills like a fish. The illustration might be carried to an indefinite
extent. From every point of view from which we look at the facts, a new
cause appears. In as many different ways as we view an effect, so many differ-
ent causes, as the word is generally used, can we find for it.
Nicholas St. John Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, 4 Am. L. REv. 201, 211-12
(1870).
215 Green, supra note 214, at 211.
216 See Horwitz, supra note 174, at 481.
217 Green, supra note 214, at 215
218 HART & HONORS, supra note 180, at 5.
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Hart's and Honor6's famous treatise on causation explains how
troublesome it is for courts to refer to "proximate cause" as a decision
based upon objective causation principles rather than a policy-driven
inquiry.
[W]e must take care not to be deceived, by the language used, as to
the character of these issues. The terminology of legal rules often
tempts courts to consider these issues in the form of questions
whether the harm was the "consequence" or "effect" or "caused by"
the wrongful act, or whether it was "too remote" or "insufficiently
proximate," or whether some third party's action, or some ex-
traordinary natural event was a "superseding cause." These ques-
tions look like questions of fact to be answered by reference to
general principles or definitions telling us in what the relationship
of cause and effect consists, or what a superseding cause is. All this,
according to the newer doctrine, is illusion: these questions are
never questions of fact. They are to be answered, not by inquiring
whether the facts of a particular case fall under some general defini-
tion of causal connection, but only by inquiring what limit of liabil-
ity of responsibility is required by "the scope," "the purpose," or
"the policy" of specific legal rules involved in the particular case. Is
it consonant with the character of the relevant rules to extend the
wrongdoer's liability to harm occurring in the way it did?219
The debate in the legal community begun in 1850 reached a pin-
nacle in 1928 in the landmark decision of Palsgraf.2-20 The majority in
Palsgraf ramed the issue in terms of duty, rather than by reference to
causation. 221 Justice Cardozo's opinion stated: "The conduct of the
[railroad] guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the pack-
age, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away.
Relatively [sic] to her it was not negligence at all."
2-
Though Judge Andrews's dissenting view in Palsgraf-that a far-
reaching duty was owed by all people to one another-has been
largely dismissed,223 since the 1920s and Palsgrafi questions of proxi-
mate cause are often answered, not through a duty analysis, but by
usingJudge Andrews's famous formulation from the Palsgraf dissent.
219 Id. at 4.
220 Palsgrafinvolved a woman who was injured by a falling scale when an unex-
pected explosion caused a disruption on the railroad platform. Palsgraf v. Long Is-
land R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928). The events were somehow set in motion
when a railroad conductor helped a passenger onto a train, dislodging a pac"age the
passenger held, which contained fireworks. See id.
221 See id at 100-01.
222 Id at 99.
223 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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What we do mean by the word "proximate" is that because of conve-
nience, of public policy, of a rough sense ofjustice, the law arbitrar-
ily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is
not logic. It is practical politics .... It is all a question of expedi-
ency. There are no fixed rules to govern ourjudgment .... There
is in truth little to guide us other than common sense.
22 4
An overarching summary of proximate cause was possibly best de-
scribed by William Prosser, who said that proximate cause is simply
"ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively possible
and convenient."
225
Palsgraf is not the only decision for which the New York Court of
Appeals is famous. In 1866 it broke with tradition and handed down a
decision that was widely seen as a "radical rejection of the idea of ob-
jective causation."2 26 Ryan v. New York Central Railroad involved as-
signing liability for a fire which destroyed several houses. 227 The court
limited liability to one homeowner, because only that house was de-
stroyed as a "proximate" result of the railroad's negligence.
228 All the
other homes were considered to be merely "remotely" affected.
2 29
The court defended its opinion, not formally or analytically, but on
policy grounds by arguing that another result would "create a liability
which would be the destruction of all civilized society."23 0 The deci-
sion was not a popular one; it received a great deal of criticism both in
America and in England. 231 "The conception of objective causation
was too central to the legitimation of the entire system of private law
for it to be abandoned even in the interest of erecting a barrier to
entrepreneurial liability."
23 2
E. Proximate Cause-Injuries Due to Defendant's Acts to a Third Party
Generally, judges are reluctant to allow tort recovery when the
injury flowed from an injury to a third party. An early effort to limit
224 Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 103-04 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
225 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 172, § 41, at 264; see also Khurana v. Innovative
Health Care Sys. Inc., 130 F.3d 143, 148 n.5, 149 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that there is
no universal formulation for determining proximate cause), vacated as moot, Teel v.
Khurana, 525 U.S. 979 (1998).
226 Horwitz, supra note 174, at 485.
227 35 N.Y. 210, 210 (1866).
228 Id. at 211-13.
229 Id. at 213.
230 Id. at 217.
231 See Horwitz, supra note 174, at 485.
232 Id. at 485-86. Likewise, the concerns about limiting enterprise liability are
particularly evident today, especially in the case of the tobacco industry law suits.
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liability by a formal or analytical rule of "remoteness" is evident in the
seminal case of Anthony v. Slaid,23 in which the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court, by Chief Justice Shaw, held that a person in-
jured only by virtue of an injury to a third party could not collect in
tort.23 Nevertheless, an important exception to Slaid developed in
subsequent Massachusetts law, holding that Staid did not apply to inju-
ries where "allegation[s] of malice on the part of the defendant to-
ward the plaintiff or anybody" or "allegation[s] of deliberate design by
the defendant to accomplish a definite end regardless of conse-
quences to others" were made.235 The traditional rule was aptly ar-
ticulated inJ. Sutherland's 1893 treatise. "Where the plaintiff sustains
injury from the defendant's conduct to a third person it is too re-
mote, ... unless the wrongful act is wilful for that purpose."2 6 Pros-
ser echoes that sentiment, explaining that "the scope of liability
should ordinarily extend to but not beyond all 'direct' (or 'directly
traceable') consequences and those indirect consequences that are foresee-
able."23t Sutherland's 1916 treatise elaborated on "willful for that pur-
pose."2 8 In that edition, Sutherland used an illustration in which the
defendant induced a ship captain to move his ship. The captain, be-
lieving the defendant to be the harbor master, followed the instruc-
tion. The plaintiff, the wharf owner who suffered a loss of rent, was
allowed to recover "if the defendant acted with a malicious and fraud-
ulent design to injure the plaintiff."2 9
Issues of limiting responsibility continue to perplex modem
scholars, but the basic framework developed by the nineteenth-cen-
233 52 Mass.-(11 Met.) 290 (1846). Slaid dealt with an assault of a pauper by the
defendant's wife, after which plaintiff paid the expenses. Sre id. at 291. The Court
held that these expenses were not recoverable. See id.
234 See id.
235 Chelsea Moving & Trucking Co. v. Ross Towboat Co., 182 N.E. 477,479 (Mass.
1932) (emphasis added); see also Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal, 165 F.2d 815, 822
n.5 (1st Cir. 1948). Keene Lumber Co. v. Leventhal held that Staid is inapplicable where
the defendant is alleged to have intended the pecuniary loss of a third party and he is
aware of the contractual relationship between that third party and the directly injured
party. See id. Chelsea Moving & Tntking Co. v. Ross Towboat Co. made dear that
whether "the damage is too remote and indirect" depends on if it is "the natural and
probable consequences of the... tort." Chsea Moving & Trudiing Co., 182 N.E. at
479.
236 J.G. SuI ,AND, A TREATISE ON THE LkNw OF DA.EcOS 68 (2d ed. 1893).
237 PROSSER & KEEToN, supra note 172, § 42, at 273 (emphasis added).
238 J.G. SurHEREAND, A TREATISE ON THE L4w OF DA.ums 128 (John R. Berr),man
ed., 4th ed. 1916).
239 Id. (citing Gregory v. Brooks, 35 Conn. 437, 446 (1868)).
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tury philosophers continues to operate as the foundation for "proxi-
mate cause" jurisprudence.
Legal scholars generally recognize the ability of fact finders to
determine whether causation in fact is present,240 aside from decisions
of liability. Causation in fact is often termed "but for" causation or
"substantial factor" causation.2 41 It focuses on whether the plaintiff's
injury flowed from the actions of the defendant. 242 It does not answer
the question whether the defendant should be held accountable.
Nevertheless, determining causation in fact is quite complex.
Some comparison between factual and contrary-to-fact conditions is
implicit in the classic formulation that a cause is a necessary antece-
dent, and in the explication that in a very real and practical sense,
the term "cause in fact" embraces all things which have so far con-
tributed to the result that without them it would not have
occurred.
2 43
Usually, causation in fact is discussed in terms of "but for" or
"substantial part." Prosser and Robert Keeton explain that an act or
omission is "not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event
would have occurred without it."244 The "but for" rule, however, is
not necessarily a limiting agent, because
once events are set in motion, there is, in terms of causation alone,
no place to stop. The event without millions of causes is simply in-
conceivable; and the mere fact of causation, as distinguished from
the nature and degree of the causal connection, can provide no
clue of any kind to singling out those which are to be held legally
responsible.
245
As a limiting factor, the "proximate cause" determination picks up
where causation in fact leaves off.
"Substantial factor" tests are employed in situations where several
causes combine to create a particular result.246 Historically, the law
240 This concept refers to whether what did occur in the world would have oc-
curred if other counter-factual elements had been present. See PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 172, § 41, at 265.
241 Id. at 263-66.
242 See id.
243 Id. at 265.
244 Id. at 266.
245 Id.
246 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965).
Negligent Conduct as Necessary Antecedent of Harm: (1) Except as stated in
Subsection (2), the actor's negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in
bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been sustained even
if the actor had not been negligent. (2) If two forces are actively operating,
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has been unvilling to absolve one actor from liability simply because
of the presence of another actor.247 These questions are typically left
to juries.248 The causation in fact inquiry is preliminary to a "proxi-
mate cause" determination, but notions of fairness and justice come
into play even at this primary stage. Courts look to discover beyond
"but for," whether the cause in question was a "significant" or "impor-
tant" part of the consequence. 249 Causation in fact, as a preliminary
inquiry, is often confused with a final proximate cause determination
when in reality the two should, according to Prosser and Keeton, be
kept separate and distinct. "Unlike the fact of causation, with which it
is often hopelessly confused, [the proximate cause decision] is prima-
rily a problem of law."250
Understanding the doctrine of foreseeability is particularly im-
portant with respect to intervening causes. An intervening cause is
"one which comes into active operation in producing the result after
the negligence of the defendant."25 1 When a "secondary" cause con-
tributes to a result, courts must ask whether that second cause can be
said to have superseded the first in terms of substantiality or direct-
ness.252 Prosser and Keeton succinctly identify the crux of the issue.
one because of the actor's negligence, the other not because of any miscon-
duct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about the harm to
another, the actor's negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in
bringing it about.
Id.
247 See PRossER & XrON, supra note 172, § 41, at 266-68.
248 See RESTATEmNr (SEcoNa) OF ToRTs § 434 (1965).
Functions of Court andJury (1) It is the function of the court to determine
(a) whether the evidence as to the facts makes an issue upon which the jury
may reasonably differ as to whether the conduct of the defendant has been a
substantial factor in causing the harm to the plaintiff; (b) whether the harm
to plaintiff is capable of apportionment among two or more causes; and (c)
the questions of causation and apportionment, in any case in which the july
may not reasonably differ. (2) It is the function of the jury to determine, in
any case in which it may reasonably differ on the issue, (a) whether the de-
fendant's conduct has been a substantial factor in causing the harm to the
plaintiff, and (b) the apportionment of the harm to two or more causes.
Id.
249 P ossmt & KEEroN, supra note 172, § 42, at 273.
250 Id.
251 I& § 44, at 301.
252 See REsrATFmr (SEcoND) OF ToTs § 442B (1965).
Intervening Force Causing Same Harm as That Risked by Actor's Conduct
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or increases the risk of a
particular harm and is a substantial factor in causing that harm, the fact that
the harm is brought about through the intervention of another force does
not relieve the actor of liability, except where the harm is intentionally
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On its face, the problem is one of whether the defendant is to be
held liable for an injury to which the defendant has in fact made a
substantial contribution, when it is brought about by a later cause of
independent origin, for which the defendant is not responsible. In
its essence, however, it becomes again a question of the extent of
the defendant's original obligation; and once more the problem is
not primarily one of causation at all, since it does not arise until
cause in fact is established. It is rather one of the policy as to impos-
ing legal responsibility.
253
Traditionally, notions of limiting liability to risk are employed in
cases where intervening causes are identified in addition to a defen-
dant's conduct. Usually, the law will require a defendant to anticipate
a normal flow of events following his actions, but will not expect a
defendant to anticipate a consequence that is not reasonably con-
nected. 254 Further, a defendant will not usually be held liable unless
his conduct "created or increased an unreasonable risk of harm
through its intervention."
255
V. RICO AND ANTITRUST APPROACHES TO PRoxIMATE CAUSE
The challenges presented to common law judges in implement-
ing a system of causation that would limit liability in a reasonable man-
ner are echoed in the difficulties judges today have in applying
RICO 2 5 6 and the Clayton Act.25 7 An overview of the development of
antitrust proximate cause principles is, therefore, crucial to an under-
standing of proximate cause theory under RICO.
caused by a third person and is not within the scope of the risk created by
the actor's conduct.
Id.
253 PROssER & KEETON, supra note 172, § 44, at 301.
254 See id. at 303-06.
255 Id. at 305.
256 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994); see Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.
Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 (1983) ("It is common ground
that the judicial remedy cannot encompass every conceivable harm that can be traced
to alleged wrongdoing. In both situations the infinite variety of claims that may arise
make it virtually impossible to announce a black-letter rule that will dictate the result
in every case."); see also Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 n.13 (1982)
(stating that "the traditional principle of proximate cause suggests the use of words
such as 'remote,' 'tenuous,' 'fortuitous,' 'incidental,' or 'consequential' to describe
those injuries that will find no remedy at law").
257 Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 & 29 U.S.C.).
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A. Antitrust
Section four of the Clayton Act reads, in part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in
any district court of the United States... and shall recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.2
8
This section of the Clayton Act was itself taken from the language
of section seven of the Sherman Act,2 9 which was designed to create
an "effective remedy for consumers who were forced to pay excessive
prices by the giant trusts and combinations that dominated certain
interstate markets." 260 The legislative history of the Sherman Act indi-
cates that common law principles were to be applied in construing the
Act 26 ' Senator Sherman explained that the bill "does not announce a
new principle of law, but applies old and well recognized principles of
the common law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Fed-
eral Government."262 Courts, therefore, used proximate cause prind-
ples to limit claims for relief under the Sherman Act.-63 They used
similar principles when the Clayton Act was enacted. 2-0 Instead of
reading the statute literally, judges looked to questions of foreseeabil-
ity and directness of injury to inform their decisions. 65 The lower
federal courts were "virtually unanimous in concluding that Congress
did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages for
all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust viola-
tion."266 The Supreme Court in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready,
2 67
commented:
An antitrust violation may be expected to cause ripples of harm to
flow through the Nation's economy; but "despite the broad wording
of § 4 there is a point beyond which the wrongdoer should not be
held liable." It is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend
to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation
258 d. § 15(a).
259 See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 530 (citing Sherman Act, ch. 649, § 7,
26 Stat. 210 (1890) (repealed 1955)).
260 Id.
261 Id. at 531.
262 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890) (Statement of Sen. Sherman).
263 See Associated Gen. Contracto, 459 U.S. at 533-34.
264 See id. at 534-35.
265 See id. at 532.
266 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972).
267 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
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to maintain an action to recover threefold for the injury to his busi-
ness or property.
268
B. Associated General Contractors
Prior to 1983, antitrustjurisprudence reflected a tendency on the
part of lower courts to apply labels to resolve issues of proximate cause
and their bearing on plaintiffs' standing.2 69 While some decisions
might be termed "correct," a lack of consistency resulted. The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in Associated General Contractors, Inc. v.
California State Council of Carpenters (AGC) to "synthesiz[e] its prior de-
cisions, and outline a multi-factor inquiry to determine standing ques-
tions."270 The Supreme Court has expressly eschewed a black letter
rule for determining standing in antitrust cases. The Court referred
to "previously decided cases [that] identify factors that circumscribe
and guide the exercise of judgment in deciding whether the law af-
fords a remedy in specific circumstances. '271 It explained, "Some
courts have focused on the directness of the injury .... As a number
of commentators have observed, these labels may lead to contradic-
tory and inconsistent results .... In our view, courts should analyze
each situation in light of the factors set forth in the text infra."2 72 The
Court then discussed several factors that would inform its decision
whether damages should be awarded as a result of antitrust violations.
The factors outlined in AGC were (1) specific intent, (2) a causal
connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the alleged in-
jury, (3) antitrust injury itself, (4) the relative directness or indirect-
ness of the asserted injury, (5) issues surrounding damage
apportionment, (6) speculativeness of damages, as well as (7) the
268 Id. at 476-77 (citation omitted).
269 These labels included "directness," "target," or "zone of interest." See, e.g., Asso-
dated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537 n.33. But see Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300
U.S. 577, 586 (1937) ("[L]abels... are subject to the dangers that lurk in metaphors
... and must be watched ... lest they put us off our guard."); Randolph S. Sherman,
Sherman Antitrust Standing. From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 374, 407 (1976)
("[I]t is simply not possible to fashion an across-the-board and easily applied standing
rule which can serve as a tool of decision for every case.").
270 Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 521. AGC arose out of a collective bar-
gaining dispute in which the plaintiff union alleged violation of the antitrust laws by
the defendant association with respect to relationships with non-union organizations.
See id. at 522-23. The violation allegedly resulted in a restraint of trade for the un-
ions. See id. at 527. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit on
the grounds of an insufficient complaint. See id. at 545-46.
271 Id. at 537.
272 Id. at 536 n.33.
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presence of less remote claimants to present the claim. -73 The ap-
proach of AGC specifically rejected the formal or analytical approach
of the nineteenth century;, it substituted a case-by-case factor approach
for any "black letter" rule.
It is common ground that the judicial remedy cannot encompass
every conceivable harm that can be traced to alleged wrongdo-
ing ..... -[T]he infinite variety of claims that may arise make it
virtually impossible to announce a black-letter rule that will dictate
the result in every case. Instead, previously decided cases identify
factors that circumscribe and guide the exercise ofjudgment in de-
ciding whether the law affords a remedy in specific
circumstances.2
74
Specific intent of the defendant is relevant to determining
whether a violation has occurred, but will not automatically operate to
place the claim within the ambit of the Clayton AcL275 The Court
made it express that an injury technically falling within the framework
of the statute might still not be actionable. "[I]n McCready, we specifi-
cally held: 'The availability of the [section four] remedy to some per-
son who claims its benefit is not a question of the specific intent of the
conspirators.'"276 The Court remarked that "an allegation of im-
proper motive, although it may support a plaintiff's damages claim
under [section four], is not a panacea that will enable any complaint
to withstand a motion to dismiss."277 To that end, the Court departed
from the rule that had been developing since Slaid278 which created
and recognized a "willful" exception to the remoteness rule.
The second factor was a causal connection that required a factual
link between the "wrong" and the injury. Without "but for" or "sub-
stantial factor" relation, the claim would fail.
The third factor the Court identified was the nature of the al-
leged injury. It looked at the nature of the alleged injury and com-
pared it to the types of injury the antitrust provision had been enacted
to redress.279 Under the Clayton Act, pleading the correct type of in-
jury is central to recovery-if an injury is not within the scope of Con-
gress's intent in drafting the law, then the policies reflected by the
273 See id. at 537-45.
274 Id. at 536-37 (footnote omitted).
275 See id. at 537 n.35.
276 Id. at 537 (quoting Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,479 (1982)).
"It is well settled that a defendant's specific intent may sometimes be relemant to the
question whether a violation of law has been alleged." Id. at 537 n.35.
277 Id. at 537.
278 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 290 (1846).
279 See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 538.
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statute will not be effectuated. The Sherman Act was "enacted to as-
sure customers the benefits of price competition."
280
The fourth factor addressed by the Court was the relative direct-
ness or indirectness of the alleged injury. The Court analyzed the
chain of causation between the injury and the alleged restraint of
trade.281 Practical considerations fueled the concern about indirectly
injured plaintiffs. Remote injuries present problems concerning allo-
cation of judicial resources. The Court explained that limiting stand-
ing would keep "the scope of complex antitrust trials within judicially
manageable limits." 2 2 The Court's primary focus in AGC, however,
was to determine "the existence of an identifiable class of persons
whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the
public interest in antitrust enforcement" and to concentrate the re-
covery in them rather than to dissipate it among competing claims at
the same time, to prevent leaving "a significant antitrust violation un-
detected or unremedied."
283
Related to the general consideration of competing claims be-
tween direct and indirectly injured claimants were the dangers of
double recovery and the problems of apportioning multi-layered dam-
ages.284 In the antitrust context, in particular, injuries to several enti-
ties along a distribution chain can muddy the waters, in terms of
damage awards, because courts have difficulty identifying the extent
to which each entity was in fact injured and the extent to which they
passed on their losses.
285
Remoteness, too, raised the specter of independent factors that
may have affected the injury to the degree that the damage claim
would be "highly speculative. '286 Speculativeness is a concern impli-
cated by the indirectness of an injury, because "any attempt to ascer-
tain damages . . . 'would often require additional long and
complicated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated
theories.' "287
280 Id.
281 See id. at 540.
282 Id. at 543.
283 Id. at 542; see, e.g., Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 131
F.3d 874, 889 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Illinois Brick rule meant that the court
"selects the better plaintiff between two possible types of plaintiffs").
284 See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 543-44.
285 See id. at 544.
286 Id. at 542.
287 Id. at 544 (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S.
481, 493 (1968)).
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The Court stopped short of holding that an indirect party could
never sue under the Clayton Act. It limited its analysis to the case at
hand and explained that "[t]he existence of an identifiable class of
persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate
the public interest in antitrust enforcement diminishes the justifica-
tion for allowing a more remote party... to perform the office of a
private attorney general."2ss The Court surmised that "if there is sub-
stance to the [indirect] claim, it is difficult to understand why...
direct victims of the conspiracy have not asserted any claim in their
own right."2 9 A crucial element of the decision, therefore, was that
the Court's denial of standing to the indirect party did not leave the
injury unredressed. Instead, it identified another, better-suited party
to bring the claim, who could be a private enforcer of the antitrust
provision.
C. RCO-Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.
In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,29 the Supreme
Court took up the proximate cause determination in the context of a
RICO complaint.291 The Supreme Court's careful analysis of injury
and causation in AGC provided the background to RICO's treble-dam-
age provisions. The similarity of approach in determining proximate
cause between the Supreme Court's framework for antitrust in AGC
and for RICO in Holmes is hardly accidental. The factors itemized in
AGC are similar, but not identical, to the factors set out in Holmes.
Nevertheless, the analytical framework is the same. One distinction is
particularly notable. "In AGC 'directness' was an independent factor,
at best, until the summary paragraph of AGC, where it was subsumed
in 'speculation.'" 292 The Court in Holmes, however, did not treat di-
288 Id. at 542.
289 Id. at 541 n.47.
290 503 U.S. 258 (1992). Holmes involved a securities fraud action in which a non-
profit securities protection company sought to protect the customers of one of its
members, alleging, among other claims, RICO violations. &e id. at 263. The Court
held that the security protection company did not have standing to sue under RICO.
See id. at 276.
291 RICO, unlike its antitrust parent, does not require a "racketeering-t)pe" injury
to be alleged. "This rejection clearly relaxes the RICO proximate cause test from that
applied in antitrust, by focusing on more direct cause and effect relationships than
the necessarily more attenuated ones implied by the amorphous concepts of 'anti-
competitive' injury and violation." Brandenburg v. Siedel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1189 n.11
(4th Cir. 1988).
292 G. Robert Blakey, The 3rd Circuit: Thoughlfiu but Muddled, Civ. RICO REP.,July
10, 2000, at 3, 4.
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rectness independently, rather, it referred to directness as a
conclusion.29
3
The Holmes Court synthesized the seven policy factors of AGC into
three policy factors in RICO: (1) whether the remoteness of the injury
would make it relatively "more difficult... to ascertain the amount of
a plaintiff's damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from
other, independent factors,"294 (2) whether "recognizing the claims of
the indirectly injured would force courts to adopt complicated rules
apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of
injury from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recov-
eries," 295 and (3) whether "directly injured victims can generally be
counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without
any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more
remotely."296 Because RICO does not have an analogue to the anti-
trust requirement of "antitrust injury," the Holmes Court did not, of
course, impose an antitrust injury requirement on RICO. As in AGC,
the Holmes Court specifically eschewed any analytical formula:
As we said in Associated General Contractors, "the infinite variety of
claims that may arise make it virtually impossible to announce a
black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case." Thus, our
use of the term "direct" should merely be understood as a reference
to the proximate cause enquiry that is informed by the concerns set
out in the text. We do not necessarily use... [direct injury] in the
same sense as courts before us have and intimate no opinion on
results they reached.
297
The concern with difficulty of proof is motivated by an underly-
ing desire to have the best plaintiff bring suit. This judgment is rela-
tive. Wholly speculative damages are, of course, never recoverable.
201
The Holmes remoteness approach is not concerned with speculative
damages. Instead, it asks whether the indirectness of injury will make
the determination of damages more difficult than it would be with an-
other plaintiff. The plaintiff with the most direct injury will most
293 See G. Robert Blakey, Federal Circuit Courts Wrong as a Matter of Law in Taft-
Hartley Fund Litigation with Big Tobacco, Civ. RICO REP., July 10, 2000, at 4.
294 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 269-70.
297 Id. at 272 n.20 (citations omitted).
298 See, e.g.,J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9, 123-25 (1969);
Anderson v. Kutak, Rock & Campbell (In re Taxable Mun. Bond Sec. Litig.), 51 F.3d
518, 523 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that "speculative damages are not compensable
under RICO"); accord Gen. Envtl. Sci. Corp. v. Horsfall, 800 F. Supp. 1497, 1504 (N.D.
Ohio 1992), affd in part and vacated in part, 25 F.3d 1048 (6th Cir. 1994).
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likely have the simplest case to prove. "[T]he less direct an injury is,
the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a plaintiff's
damages attributable to the violation,, as distinct from other, indepen-
dent factors."299 Recognizing extremely remote claims would need-
lessly complicate the process of awarding damages. On the other
hand, non-recognition of extremely remote claims would concentrate
recovery in the hands of the most direct claimants.
The second concern addressed by the Holmes Court was the possi-
bility of double recovery of damages where more than one claimant is
recognized. Identifying the best plaintiff motivates this factor, too. If
every party injured in fact were permitted to sue, an apportionment of
damages would be nearly impossible. This factor of the test echoes
some of the Court's concerns from the first factor. For instance, the
fear of a system becoming overwhelmed with a great number of plain-
tiffs, some with injuries that follow only remotely from racketeering
activity, informs the remoteness requirement.
The overarching goal of Holmes, as in AGC, was to make certain
that the best situated plaintiff brought the case.300 The final policy
factor outlined in Holmes expressly identifies the concern about multi-
ple plaintiffs. The Court found that the best way to guard against the
potential for multiple claims was to suggest that the trial court inquire
into whether a more directly injured party was present who should
bring the claim. The inquiry to determine the best plaintiff should
not be a method of precluding deserved recovery. It should merely be
an attempt to find the best plaintiff. It asks whether "the general in-
terest in deterring injurious conduct"30' will be better served by more
directly injured victims30 2 who could "generally be counted on to vin-
dicate the law as private attorneys general."303 The ultimate policy
driving this factor, as in the other two, is the desire to have RICO
enforced in the most effective manner.
VI. PROXIMATE CAUSE ANALYsis iN ToBAcco LIGATION
Applying the standards enunciated by today's courts, it is difficult
to imagine a set of circumstances that would militate more strongly in
favor of a finding of proximate cause and liability than the present
tobacco litigation. If the allegations are to be believed, the defend-
299 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269.
300 See id.; see also Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542 (1983).
301 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269.
302 See i&
303 Id. at 270.
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ants in these suits are responsible for one of the most colossal and
reproachful frauds in the history of American society3
0 4
A. The Allegations, the Funds, and the Defense
In the Philip Morris litigation, Taft Hartley Funds (Funds) sought
to recover the millions of dollars they expended to treat the smoking
beneficiaries of their plans.305 The Funds alleged that costs were in-
curred as a result of the fraud perpetrated by the industry in relation
to the health risks of cigarettes.306 The alleged fraud related to the
conspiracy to both suppress safer cigarettes and deceive the public
about the true nature of nicotine and tobacco 07 The Funds also al-
leged that the defendants' conduct "deliberate [ly] target[ed] health-
care payors, such as the [Funds], with misinformation and
disinformation regarding the nature of tobacco products."308 Had the
Funds known this information, they could have "reduced their medi-
cal costs by aggressively discouraging smoking by health plan partici-
pants; implementing smoking cessation programs sooner (like
nicotine patches, gum, or inhalers); adjusting deductibles, co-pay-
ments, or coverage for health plans; or otherwise taken steps to design
or operate health plans in a way that would have lowered smoldng-
related expenses."30 9 The Funds sought to recover under both the
antitrust laws and RICO.3 10
304 See Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 560, 584
(E.D.N.Y. 1999); supra note 3.
305 See Brief for Appellants at 12-14, Tex. Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v.
Philip Morris, 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 98-41232).
306 See id. at 16-17.
307 See id. at 15-16.
308 Id. at 3-4.
309 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 844
(2000) (No. 98-1426). The Fund estimated that
approximately 10% of their total health-care costs have been incurred as a
result of tobacco-related illnesses, based primarily on a damages model using
widely accepted government and scientific statistics concerning smoking
prevalence and risk of disease. The amount of those costs that would have
been avoided but for defendants' misconduct constitutes damages. In addi-
tion, the Trusts' use of their assets to pay for treating tobacco-related ill-
nesses meant that those assets were not available for other health-related
purposes, which would have led to even greater savings by the Trusts.
Brief for Appellants at 11, Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 (No. 98-1426).
310 See infra Part VI.B.1.
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Over thirty million Americans participate in health care systems
managed by the Funds.311 These trust funds were established under
and are governed by federal law.3 12 They are not themselves insur-
ance companies that pool risk and seek to make a profit; rather, they
are non-profit, existing only for the benefit of their beneficiaries.
They provide healthcare and other similar benefits to those workers
who are a party to collective bargaining agreements.313 Both labor
and management administer the funds,3 14 which are governed by a
board of trustees with representatives from the worker's union and
the employees.3 15 These trustees are fiduciaries and are monitored
under the strict guidelines of the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 (ERISA),316 which require them to administer the
Funds for the sole benefit of the workers and their dependents.
317
Any money recovered by the Funds could not be claimed by the
smoker-workers themselves.318 The trusts are funded by employer con-
tributions that stem from collective bargaining agreements319 and play
a crucial role in the employment-centered healthcare system in
America. The agreement sets the rate of contribution, and it is often
based upon a dollars-per-hour-worked rate.320 The amount of contri-
bution will vary with the amount of work that is covered by the agree-
ment,321 and any changes must be made by the parties to the
agreement.3 22 Because the Funds pool the money collectively, each
311 See Brief for Appellants at 10, Steamfiters Local Union No. 420 (No. 98-1426).
"Most of these people would lack health care coverage and be dependant upon gov-
ernment programs (or at risk of financial ruin) but for the exdstence of pooled Taft-
Hartley trust funds." Id. "A substantial public interest is served by protecting the fiscal
integrity" of these Funds. Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1374 (3d Cir. 1994).
312 See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 302(c) (5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 186(c) (5) (1994).
313 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8-9, Stiamfillers Local Union No. 420 (No.
99-545).
314 See id.
315 See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (B) (1994); NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322,
325 (1981); Cutaiar v. Marshall, 590 F.2d 523, 525 (3d Cir. 1979).
316 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) §§ 402-09, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1102-09 (1994); see also Amax Coal, 453 U.S. at 331.
317 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) §§ 403(a), (c) (1),
404(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a), (c)(1), 1104(a) (1).
318 See Brief for Appellants at 12, Tex. Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 98-41232); see also Amax Coal, 453 U.S.
at 322.
319 See Brief for Appellants at 12, T= Capenters (No. 98-41232).
320 See id.
321 See i&
322 See id. at 12-13.
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beneficiary, whether a smoker or nonsmoker, is affected by the dimin-
ishment of funds available for healthcare expenses.3 2 3 Under ERISA,
the Funds are permitted to sue and be sued in the beneficiaries'
names.3 24 This right is similar to that of corporations, allowing the
Fund to sue for diminishment of assets.3 25 Further, the ability to sue
rises to the level of a fiduciary duty to enforce the rights of the Funds
vis-A-vis those who harm it in any way.
326
The defense of the tobacco companies to the Funds' suits was
varied and complex, but their proximate cause or remoteness defense
was largely built around a claimed black-letter rule prohibiting recov-
ery for the payor of medical expenses by a third party directly from
the tortfeasor.3 27 Each circuit's case was built around slightly different
theories, but the factual allegations remained essentially the same.
Section B focuses upon the proximate cause determinations in each
of these cases.
B. The Circuits'Decisions
All five circuit courts of appeals who heard Funds cases denied
them standing.328 While the final result was the same in each case,
each circuit rested its decision on varying legal reasoning. None of
the circuits summarized the facts of the massive fraud perpetrated by
the industry. The Third Circuit acknowledged the controlling AGC
and Holmes factors, but erred in two major respects. First, the panel
decided that the suppression of safer cigarette products was not an
antitrust injury.329 Second, the panel expressed doubt as to the pro-
priety of utilizing statistical data in assessing damages.33 0 The Second
Circuit all but ignored the precedents of AGC and Holmes in its initial
323 See id. at 13.
324 See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d) (1) (1994).
325 See generally Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825
(1988); Ariz. State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Citibank, 125 F.3d 715 (9th Cir.
1997); Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1996); Painters of Philadelphia Dist.
Council No. 21 Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146 (3d Cir. 1989);
Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Sec. Fund v. Cont'l Assurance Co., 700
F.2d 889, 892-93 (2d Cir. 1983); Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund v. Mes-
sera, No. 95 Civ. 9341, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14822 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1996).
326 See Struble v. N.J. Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325,
336-39 (3d Cir. 1984).
327 See generally Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc.,
23 F. Supp. 2d 771 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
328 See The Circuit Court Decisions, Civ. RICO REP., July 10, 2000, at 3, 3-7.
329 See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171
F.3d 912, 929-30 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 844 (2000).
330 See id. at 930.
[VOL- 76:1
NOTE: UP IN SMOKE
decision and declared that the injury was "derivative," a newly-created
label.33 ' It formulated a new rule of law, holding that one paying the
medical costs of another may only sue to recover through subroga-
tion.3 32 The Ninth Circuit purported to apply the AGC and Holmes
factors, but erroneously found that the Funds' antitrust and RICO
damages duplicated the tort damages smokers might recovera3 33 Like
the Third Circuit, the panel also wrongly held that standing, under
antitrust, was limited to customers or consumers in a market.334 The
Seventh Circuit admitted that statistical data would help assess the
amount of damages, but denied that the insurance company before it
had alleged an antitrust injury.335 The Fifth Circuit's opinion offered
few reasons to justify its decision-it simply agreed with the opinions




The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of dismis-
sal3 37 in Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc.3 38 Plaintiff health care Funds claimed they were directly affected
by the defendants' fraudulent conduct, especially with respect to the
suppression of the manufacture of safer tobacco products.33 9 The
Funds claimed they could have developed programs designed to in-
form smokers about safer options or treatment programs.310 Addi-
tionally, they alleged that the defendants' misconduct, constituting
both antitrust and RICO violations, caused smokers to start smoking,
continue to smoke, and become more ill, thus incurring increased
331 See The Second Circuit: Advance with Text-Retreat with Footnotes, Civ. RICO REP.,
July 10, 2000, at 3, 4-5.
332 See, e.g., Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191
F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. deniAe, 120 S. Ct. 799 (2000).
333 See The 9th Circuit: Right Approach-Wrong Result, Cv- RICO REP.,July 10, 2000,
at 3, 5.
334 See Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris Inc.,
185 F.3d 957, 963-65 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. deniAe, 120 S. Ct. 789 (2000).
335 See The Seventh Circuit: Misdircted Economic Analysis, Cnxv RICO REP., July 10,
2000, at 3, 5-7.
336 See The Fifth Circuit: Inconsistent "lMetooisin," Cn,. RICO REP., July 10, 2000, at 3,
7.
337 See Steamrfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., No.
Civ. A. 97-5344, 1998 WL 212846, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1998), aftd, 171 F.3d 912
(3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 844 (2000).
338 See 171 F.3d 912, 937 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 844 (2000).
339 See id. at 918.
340 See id.
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medical costs. 3 41 The damages identified equaled the amount of
money the Funds spent in health care costs that would have been
avoided absent defendants' unlawful conduct.
3 42
The district court dismissed the complaint because it concluded
that the plaintiff's injuries were too remote3 43 and the Third Circuit
followed the district court's flawed reasoning.3 44 The Third Circuit
held that the claim was insufficiently direct and too speculative to rec-
ognize.3 45 The court's primary mistake was to treat directness as an
independent factor in the proximate cause analysis, rather than as a
conclusion based on a policy-driven inquiry.3 46 The result was to im-
munize the tobacco industry against the best-suited plaintiff to vindi-
cate the wrongdoing of immense and wide-reaching proportions.
Before embarking upon the AGC balancing test, the panel di-
vided the injuries to the Funds into "direct" and "indirect. '3 47 The
injuries flowing from the victimization of smokers who participated in
the Funds' health plans were referred to as indirect injuries.3 48 The
industry also argued that these claims were simply subrogation claims
"dressed up in treble-damages federal statutory clothing,"3 49 meaning
that the Funds could only recover by asserting the same claim and
would be subject to the same defenses as the beneficiaries. The Funds
341 See id. at 918.
342 See id. at 919. The Funds also sought injunctive relief requiring defendants to
make their research public, undertake a public education campaign, stop advertising
to minors, and provide funds for smoking cessation programs. See id. at 918.
343 See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., No.
Civ. A. 97-5344, 1998 WL 212846, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1998), affid, 171 F.3d 912
(3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 844 (2000).
344 See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420, 171 F.3d at 932-33.
345 See id. at 933.
346 See id. at 932-33; Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 272 n.20
(1992); see also Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535-36 (1982) (stating that courts should analyze every
showing in light of seven factors, of which relative directness of injury is only one);
supra note 273 and accompanying text (listing factors).
347 Steamfitters Local Union No. 420, 171 F.3d at 919-20.
348 See id. at 919.
349 Id. In so doing, the defense claimed the general principle is that an insurer
may only implement a subrogation claim when suing a tortfeasor on behalf of an
insured. See id. In a subrogation claim, the insurer must assert an identical claim as
the insured would have brought against the tortfeasor. See id. In this case, that princi-
ple would allow the Funds to recover only from the same type of actions that smokers
could have individually brought. See id.; see also Great Am. Ins. Co. v. United States,
575 F.2d 1031, 1033 (2d Cir. 1978) (explaining that subrogation subjects the plaintiff
to the defenses the defendant would be able to employ against tie insured).
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would be, according to the industry, limited to the tort actions that
could be brought by smokers themselves.
Notwithstanding the subrogatioh argument, the Funds' "direct"
claims were treated separately by the panel. The panel characterized
the direct injuries as "fundamentally different legal claim[s] from the
typical insurer-against-wrongdoer claim that fials under the principle
of subrogation."350 These direct injuries were a result of actions taken
on the part of the tobacco industry that directly affected the Funds.
The Funds claimed that they had to "expend additional costs that
would have been paid by the tobacco companies (through reduced
revenues and tort damages) if they had not defrauded the Funds and
conspired to cover up their wrongdoing."351
While the panel took the time to recognize the difference be-
tween the indirect and direct injuries of the Funds, it ultimately stated
that "we do not find the directness of the Funds' alleged injury dispos-
itive of whether they stated a claim under either federal or state
law."3 52 The panel then narrowed its discussion to the proximate
cause issue, noting the Supreme Court's instructions in AGC and
Holmes..35
a. Associated General Contractors Factors Analysis
The panel recognized that "there may be a causal relationship
between the conduct of the defendants and the injuries alleged," but
continued, "we are uncertain that these injuries are connected to any
conduct of the defendants that violates the antitrust laws." 35 In stat-
ing, "we do not find these factors to be dispositive on the issue of
antitrust standing," 55 the panel relied on the fact that, in AGC, a
causal connection and an intent to harm did not suffice to give the
plaintiff antitrust standing.3 56
Specific intent is not discussed in the Third Circuit's antitrust
standing requirements section. While intent to harm does not, on its
own, provide standing, it is certainly an informative factor that should
have been addressed in the AGC factor balancing test.
In comparing the Funds' case with that of the plaintiff in AGC,
the panel believed that the court's conclusion that "the Union is
350 Steamfitters Local Union No. 420, 171 F.3d at 920.
351 Id.
352 Id
353 See id. at 922-33.
354 Id. at 926.
355 IM at 925.
356 Seeid.
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neither a participant in the market.., nor a direct victim of defend-
ants' coercive practices... inveigh led] against plaintiffs' position." 7
The panel focused on the foreseeability of the "indirect" injury and
concluded that, under the AGC model, "foreseeability was insufficient
to overcome the remoteness of the union's injury from the defend-
ants' wrongdoing."358 In focusing its attention upon the "direct" in-
jury, the panel conceded that if the Funds "1[w] ere in the market for
safer tobacco products that would reduce or prevent people from
smoking . . . [, t]hese claims might meet the third factor from
AGC.,359
The panel also conceded that the Funds' direct injury claims
"might also meet the fourth factor from AGC."3 60 Hardly a resound-
ingly positive statement, the panel's tone revealed its efforts to deny
proximate cause regardless of the factor analysis. The panel admitted
that no more direct party existed who could sue to vindicate the pub-
lic interest. "Smokers can sue for personal injuries arising from smok-
ing, but they are unlikely (or unable) to press antitrust claims against
the tobacco companies."3
61
In continuing with its confusing logic, the panel stated, "Al-
though we acknowledge that plaintiffs' claims of direct injury appear,
at least initially, to meet a number of the first four AGG factors, we
question whether these direct injuries are necessarily more direct than
the indirect injuries on which much of our discussion has focusedY.9)6 2
The panel explained that "[a]lthough the alleged wrongdoing was
more directly aimed at the Funds, the injury itself certainly was no
more direct than the indirect injury that arose from the defendants'
actions toward smokers. '363 This line of reasoning seems to do little
to advance the panel's decision, but nevertheless it is included
therein.
The Third Circuit glossed over the AGC requirement that a more
directly injured plaintiff must be identified and that this plaintiff must
also have "sufficient incentive" to sue.
364
357 Id. at 926 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Coun-
cil of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 540 n.44 (1983)).
358 Id.





364 See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542 (1983).
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Before addressing the final AGO factors, the court astonishingly
reached a conclusion. "At all events, as is clear from our extensive
review of all of the AGCfactors, we find that however plaintiffs charac-
terize their claims-as direct or indirect-they necessarily fail for be-
ing too remotely connected in the causal chain from any wrongdoing
on defendants' part."36 5 This conclusion should have been the prod-
uct of a balancing of all the factors, following a full analysis. Instead,
the panel summarily concluded that although most of the factors were
met, the injury was still too remote.
The panel conflated speculative damages with relative difficulty
of proof. It explained that "the Funds' damages claims are quite spec-
ulative (and very difficult to measure)."366 The damages would have
had to be calculated, it thought, through aggregation and statistical
modeling, which it found to be incapable of"get[ting] the Funds over
the hurdle of the AGC factor focusing on whether the 'damages claim
is... highly speculative.'"-367 This logic is circular. Once the plaintiffs
present a manner in which to calculate damages, they are no longer
speculative. Furthermore, if the fact of damages is proven, the stan-
dard for proving the amount of damages is less stringent scs Addition-
ally, the damage model should not have been rejected until either
summary judgment or trial, especially when it had already been de-
dared valid.36
9
The panel conceded that "AGO's sixth factor does not militate
against a finding of antitrust standing, as there is little danger of dupli-
cative litigation or complex apportionment of damages among various
groups of plaintiffs."370 However, the discussion of speculativeness
overshadowed a full discussion of this factor.
Shockingly, although the panel found that most of the AGC fac-
tors were not of particular concern, it stated:
The short of it is that, while we find that the plaintiffs' antitrust
claims barely meet certain AGO factors, the fulfillment of these fac-
tors is greatly outweighed by the extremely indirect nature of the
Funds' injuries and the highly speculative and complex damages
claims. The tortured path that one must follow from the tobacco
companies' alleged wrongdoing to the Funds' increased expendi-
365 Steamfiters Local Union No. 420, 171 F.3d at 928.
366 Id. at 928-29.
367 d. at 929.
368 SeeJ. Truett Payne Co. v. Chryler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981).
369 See Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 23 F.
Supp. 2d 771, 784, 786 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (denying in part and granting in part the
defendant's motion to dismiss).
370 Steamfitters Local Union No. 420, 171 F.3d at 928 (footnotes omitted).
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tures demonstrates that the plaintiffs' claims are precisely the type
of indirect claims that the proximate cause requirement is intended
to Weed out.
3 71
The main problem with the logic of this conclusion is that AGC
expressly rejected a directness test that was separate from the policy
factors outlined in the holding. "Some courts have focused on the
directness of the injury .... As a number of commentators have ob-
served, these labels may lead to contradictory and inconsistent results.
In our view, courts should analyze each situation in light of the factors
set forth in the text infra."3 72 AGC does not make directness itself a
separate factor. It lists all of the policy factors as relevant to select the
best plaintiff to sue. The panel mistakenly deselected all plaintiffs.
The Third Circuit also erroneously applied the policy-driven,
proximate cause inquiry to claims for injunctive relief. The Supreme
Court plainly held that the remoteness factor of AGC does not apply
to claims for injunctive relief.37 3 The Third Circuit's reference to the
difficulty in determining damages bears no relevance to a claim for
injunctive relief that would require no damage calculation.
b. RICO Analysis
The panel's treatment of the RICO claims was similarly flawed.
In examining the claim under Holmes, the panel effectively created a
371 Id. at 930.
372 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. V. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 536 n.33 (1983) (citations omitted).
373 See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110-11 n.6 (1986);
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972) (citations omitted).
[T]he difference in the remedy each section provides means that certain
considerations relevant to a determination of standing under § 4 [the dam-
ages statute] are not relevant under § 16 [the injunction statute]. The
treble damages remedy, if afforded to "every person tangentially affected by
an antitrust violation ... [would] open the door to duplicative recoveries"
and to multiple law suits. In order to protect against multiple lawsuits and
duplicative recoveries, courts should examine other factors .... such as the
potential for duplicative recovery, the complexity of apportioning damages,
and the existence of other parties that have been more directly harmed, to
determine whether a party is a proper plaintiff under § 4. Conversely, under
§ 16, the only remedy available is equitable in nature, and... "the fact is that
one injunction is as effective as 100, and, concomitantly, that 100 injunctions
are no more effective than one." Thus, because standing under § 16 raises
no threat of multiple lawsuits or duplicative recoveries, some of the factors
other than antitrust injury that are appropriate to a determination of stand-
ing under § 4 are not relevant under § 16.
Cargll, 479 U.S. at 110-11 n.6 (quoting Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,
476-77 (1982)).
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new category for proximate cause determinations-"direct."37 4
Holmes explicitly warns against this error.
Our use of the term direct should merely be understood as a refer-
ence to the proximate-cause enquiry that is informed by the con-
cerns set out in the text. We do not necessarily use it in the same
sense as courts before us have and intimate no opinion on results
they reached 3 75
The court's treatment of directness as an independent factor that
supersedes the most direct plaintiff factor is particularly problematic,
because the Third Circuit sharply departed from prior case law. No
other Third Circuit or Supreme Court case could be found that had
dismissed a claim citing remoteness without identifyng a plaintiff with
more direct injuries.3 76 Furthermore, countless cases hold that analyt-
ically "indirect" plaintiffs may, under certain circumstances, recover
under both RICO and antitrust theories.377
The court admitted again that no other party was better-suited to
bring the RICO claim, but it nevertheless proffered other excuses for
denying standing.378 The court first explained that many smokers had
already been reimbursed for monetary loss.3 7 9 It then addressed
whether the plaintiff was the most directly injured, stating "we are un-
convinced that [characterization of the Funds as indirect victims, as
opposed to direct victims] is sufficient to overcome the concerns
about apportioning damages and, most fundamentally, the remote-
ness of the Funds' alleged RICO injuries from any wrongdoing on the
part of the tobacco companies."380 This statement revealed the court
374 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Steamfiiter Local Union No. 420 (No.
99-545).
375 Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 272 n.20 (1992) (citations
omitted).
376 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Steamfittein Local Union No. 420 (No.
99-545).
377 See e.g, Khurana v. Innovative Health Care Sys., Inc., 130 F.3d 143, 151-52
(5th Cir. 1997), vacated as moot Teel v. Khurana, 525 U.S. 979 (1998); Isr. Travel
Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Isr. Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir. 1995); Mid
Ad. Telecom, Inc. v. Long Distance Servs., Inc., 18 F.3d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1994);
Envtl. Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1066-67 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd,
493 U.S. 400 (1990); see also Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272 n.20; Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
378 See Steamfittens Local Union No. 420, 171 F.3d at 933.
379 See id.
380 Id. at 933-34. The Third Circuit's cynicism regarding the existence of RICO
claims has not been shared by all courts examining the issues. Sre State v. Am. To-
bacco Co., No. CL 95-1466 AH, 1996 WL 788371, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1996)
(surmising that the allegations "would seem to make out a case for the 'mother of all
RICO actions'"); see also Nat'l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 74 F.
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to be doing exactly what Holmes warned against-making a remote-
ness judgment before balancing the policy factors. Further, it failed
to address the reality that individual smokers cannot bring RICO 38 1 or
antitrust suits. The court never disputed the fact that, if the allegations
were proven, the nature of both RICO and antitrust violations would
reveal intentional costs imposed upon the plaintiffs.
Although analytical directness may often help identify the best
plaintiff to sue, it is not the only consideration. The Supreme Court
stressed that the plaintiff must also have sufficient incentive to sue.
- 82
To interpret the proximate cause analysis in such a way as to eliminate
the best plaintiff to seek redress undermines the "vigorous enforce-
ment" 383 mandate of the statutes.
384
Similarly troublesome is the fact that, even if analytical directness
were an independent factor to be used in the Holmes analysis, dismissal
could not be justified with respect to the plaintiffs' claims that the
Funds were directly defrauded and deceived without any intervening
party.385 The Third Circuit dismissed this argument, claiming that the
injury was still indirect because the actions of the tobacco industry
resulted in inaction on the part of the Funds.386 This argument seems
to be a semantic distinction. Indeed, the injury was still directly per-
Supp. 2d 221, 233 (E.D.N.Y 1999) ("Research or treatment which would have been
supported by resources of the health care industry have, it contended, gone unful-
filled as a result of the defendants' racketeering. This is arguably precisely the type of
economic injury which RICO was designed to address and deter.").
381 There is consensus among the circuits to read RICO's language, "injury to bus-
iness or property," to exclude damages for personal injuries, even if those injuries
could be pecuniary in nature. The leading decision is Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844,
846-48 (11th Cir. 1988) (excluding the economic aspects of murder, since personal
injury is not within RICO), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988). See, e.g., Genty v. Resolu-
tion Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 918 (3d Cir. 1991).
382 See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 n.6 (1989); Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542 (1983);
IL Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 736.
383 Kansas v. Utilicorp United Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 214 (1990).
384 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 (No.
99-545).
[The Supreme] Court has never countenanced dismissal of a RICO or anti-
trust claim as too indirect without identifying a more directly injured party
with the ability and incentive to sue to remedy the same statutory violation.
Nor has this Court allowed narrow readings of the RICO and antitrust laws
to undermine the broad remedial purposes of the statutes.
Id. (emphasis added).
385 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14-19, Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 (No.
99-545).
386 See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171
F.3d 912, 928 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 844 (2000).
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petrated upon the Funds. The fact that the industry's actions resulted
in inaction, rather than some other type of injury, ought to be
immaterial' s 7
The distinction the panel was setting up appears irrelevant under
the statute. The panel was attempting to create a distinction between
the Funds being fraudulently induced to spend money and the same
Funds being fraudulently induced not to spend moneys aS In being
induced not to spend money, the panel argued that the Funds were
only indirectly injured. This use of semantics is a stretch of reason
and ultimately should be given no credence. Furthermore, the law of
the Third Circuit, otherwise, directly conflicts with this distinction.s 9
An extensive discussion of remoteness in relation to the Funds' direct
case was immaterial. They alleged an injury of direct relationship to
the conduct of the defendants. With no other party standing between
the Funds and the industry, no remoteness concern was present. The
panel ignored the thrust of this argument.
The panel again conceded that damage apportionment did not
present a serious problem in this case, because "smokers would be
unlikely to bring federal claims against the tobacco companies for the
same damages claimed by the Funds."390 Nevertheless, the panel con-
tinued by noting that
Fund participants who have not been fully reimbursed for their out-
of-pocket costs that are traceable to defendants' alleged fraud and
conspiracy might bring RICO or antitrust claims. Therefore, as in
Holmes, a court adjudicating the Funds' RICO claims w-ould need to
consider the appropriate apportionment of damages between smok-
ers and others such as the Funds who suffered economic losses as a
result of the tobacco companies' alleged fraudulent acts.391
On the contrary, the Funds did not seek to recover amounts paid
by smokers for medical care. Therefore, those amounts could not
form the basis for a supposed danger of double recovery. The panel
admited that duplication was not a serious consideration weighing
against standing, but later it suggested that damages for RICO viola-
387 "One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability to the
persons or class of persons whom he intends or has reason to expect to act or refrain
from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation ... ." Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46
F.3d 1316, 1334 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting RESrATEMENT (SEcOND) OF Tors § 531
(1976)) (emphasis added).
388 See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420, 171 F.3d at 928.
389 See Mihae4 46 F.3d at 1334.
390 Steamfitters Local Union No. 420, 171 F.3d at 933.
391 I&
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tions could present a situation involving apportionment.3 92 Also, the
panel failed to recognize the fact that smokers cannot sue to recover
their medical expenses.3 93 Given this reality, no danger of duplicative
damages is present.3 94 In order for duplication to arise, more than
one plaintiff must be seeking the same damages under the same law.
Damages are not duplicative within the meaning of this proximate
cause factor unless different plaintiffs could bring the same cause of
action under RICO or antitrust for the same damages. Put another
way, RICO damages would have to duplicate RICO damages, or an-
titrust damages duplicate antitrust damages, to raise this
concern.
3 95
Furthermore, damages need not be apportioned simply because
both federal and state causes of actions are present. "'Overlapping' is
not legal 'duplication."'3 9 6 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois39 7 made this
point clearly in stating the concern is about "duplicative recoveries
under [section four of the Clayton Act]," not duplication between the
Clayton Act and other statutes.3 98 The Supreme Court later addressed
this same issue stating, "Illinois Brick was concerned that requiring di-
rect and indirect purchasers to apportion recovery under a single stat-
392 See id. at 929 n.10.
393 These expenses would be excluded as flowing from personal injury under
RICO and antitrust law. See, e.g., Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 918
(3d Cir. 1991).
394 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 (No.
99-545).
[The Third Circuit] did not appreciate that this factor is designed to
strengthen statutory enforcement by concentrating each clam [sic] in a sin-
gle plaintiff, not to weaken enforcement by precluding claims by the sole
plaintiff capable of suing. In RICO and antitrust cases involving effects of
defendants' misconduct on multiple parties in a chain of causation and in-
jury, [the Supreme Court] typically has granted standing to the party that is
first in line in suffering economic injury. When standing is denied, it is the
pass-on of the economic injury from a nonparty to the plaintiff, not the fact
that the causal chain flows through several parties, that creates problems of
the type the Holmes/AGC factors seek to avoid.
Id.
395 Brief for Appellants at 42, Tex. Carpenters Health Benefit Fund v. Philip Mor-
ris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 98-41232) (emphasis omitted); see also
Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 131 F.3d 874, 889-90 (10th
Cir. 1997) (stating that a court "selects the better plaintiff between two possible types"
and that "[c]learly the rule was not intended to immunize [unlawful] tactics or to
eliminate a private cause of action challenging those tactics").
396 Brief for Appellants at 43, Tem. Carpenters (No. 98-41232).
397 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977)
398 Id. at 731.
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ute-[section four] of the Clayton Act-would result in no one
plaintiff having a sufficient incentive to sue under that statute."399
Instead of proceeding with the Holmes policy considerations, the
court declared that indirectness and problems in accurately measur-
ing the amount, not the fact, of damages outweighed the other Holmes
factors. A subtlety of the third Holmes factor was completely over-
looked by the panel. The third factor asks whether the indirectness of
an injury would make damages harder to ascertain than if the case were
brought by another plaintiff. The court misread Holmes to inquire
whether damages are difficult to ascertain.40 0 This factor does not ad-
dress whether the damages will be difficult to determine; rather it fo-
cuses the inquiry on whether the indirectness will make it more
difficult to ascertain the amount of damages than if another, more
directly injured party sued.4°1 The panel treated difficulty in proving
damages as an independent factor, existing without reference to any
other plaintiff.4° 2 This judgment was absolute rather than relative.
While the exact extent of damages would be difficult to prove, it is
dangerously illogical to construe a statute to immunize a guilty defen-
dant simply because the breadth and depth of his fraud are too mas-
sive to gauge precisely. If the Funds are the most effective enforcers
of the law, they should have the opportunity to prove the resulting
damages. On one hand, the panel's reference to smokers' suits
presents an interesting tension; however, it conceded that smokers
could demonstrate injuries proximately caused by defendants' mis-
conduct;4°3 however, the very same problem of determining how
much money was lost due to defendants' fraud would persist.
In holding that the damage amount was too speculative, the
panel rested its decision on the fact that plaintiffi offered statistical
evidence in support of its damages claim. 4°4 In fact, the Supreme
Court expressly upheld statistical evidence to aggregate damages in
399 California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 104 (1989). A central policy objec-
tive of RICO is that it be available along with all federal and state criminal and civil
remedies. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 note (1994) (Liberal Construction of Provisions; Su-
persedure of Federal or State Laws; Authority of Attorneys Representing United
States) ("Nothing in this title shall supercede any provision of Federal, State, or other
law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those pro-
vided for in this title."). Concerns about duplication arise when one, not two, statu-
tory schemes are invoked. See ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 103-05.
400 See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171
F.3d 912, 932 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 844 (2000).
401 See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992).
402 See Steamfiters Local Union No. 420, 171 F.3d at 929.
403 See id at 926.
404 See id. at 929.
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antitrust litigation.405 And, as Daniel Givelber points out, "epidemio-
logical studies should provide a sound basis for estimating the cost of
medical services provided for smoke-related injuries. Courts can be
more confident that defendants' act caused the injury in question than
in any individual claims."40 6 Finally, a plaintiff's damage model
should not be rejected based on the complaint alone, when it has sur-
vived a motion for summary judgment in the district court.4 0 7 The
court rested on an incomplete analysis to mask its conclusory
judgment.
Hidden toward the end of the opinion is a curious statement by
the panel.
At this point in contemporary history, there can be little doubt that
the tobacco companies' products have caused smokers to contract
certain illnesses and that the plaintiff Funds (and others) have
borne some of the costs of these illnesses by reimbursing their par-
ticipants for their health care expenditures. It is therefore quite
possible that some of these health care providers and payers have
had to cut back on their coverage of other medical problems in
order to fund the costs "of smoking-related illnesses, causing other
Funds participants to pay out-of-pocket expenses they otherwise
would not have paid.408
The panel frankly admitted that the industry had injured the Funds.
The Third Circuit also never mentioned the requirement of constru-
ing RICO "liberally. . .to effectuate its remedial purposes" 409 and
conspicuously failed to mention the overarching Holmes factor-
justice.410
2. Second Circuit
In Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
Laborers Local 17 Fund and several other labor union Funds brought
suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York alleging ten distinct causes of action against defendants
405 SeeTexaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 573 n.31 (1990). Business damages
are often aggregated when RICO and antitrust claims are brought. See, e.g., id. (dis-
cussing the use of statistical evidence).
406 Givelber, supra note 28, at 900 (emphasis added).
407 See, e.g., Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc., 23 F.
Supp. 2d 771, 784 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
408 Steamfitte's Local Union No. 420, 171 F.3d at 934.
409 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994); see Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 492 (1985).
410 See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) ("ideas of
what justice demands").
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Philip Morris and other tobacco companies. 411 The allegations in the
complaint were similar to those brought by other health care payers-
detailing a conspiracy on the part of the tobacco companies to mis-
lead the public with respect to smoking-related health dangers, sup-
pression of information regarding the possibility of developing a safer
product, concealment of information regarding the effectiveness of
treatments for nicotine addiction, and other unlawful conduct.
412
The defense by the tobacco industry rested principally on the rule of
subrogation-that one who pays the costs of another person cannot
recover for the injury to that third party, under any other theory, un-
less the third party has suffered a tort injury.
413
The district court held that proximate cause had been established
between the plaintiffs' injuries and defendants' unlawful conduct.
414
It applied the Holmes factors and held that the injuries were foresee-
able and that they were not too remote to be compensated.415 The
Second Circuit granted leave to appeal and reversed the decision of
the district court.416 Although the Second Circuit treated three main
issues, 417 this portion of the Note will focus on its misapplication of
Holmes with -respect to only one, the proximate cause analysis.418
The Second Circuit's proximate cause analysis began with an
overview of proximate cause, as if the Supreme Court had not settled
the question in Holmes.419 This analysis flatly misinterpreted Holmes
and the circuit's own precedent by saying that it required analytical
directness as a prerequisite to proving proximate cause.420 The circuit
411 See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 7 F. Supp.
2d 277, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), rev'd in part, 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120
S. Ct. 799 (2000).
412 Seeid.
413 See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d
229, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied 120 S. Ct. 799 (2000).
414 See id. at 233-34 (discussing proceedings below).
415 See Laborers Local 17, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 283-85 (holding that the injuries were
foreseeable enough to survive a motion to dismiss).
416 See Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 234.
417 The total list of issues treated was directness, speculativeness, and a failure to
properly apply case precedent to claims for injunctive relief. See id. at 239-43.
418 For a discussion of the improper decision of the Second Circuit, especially ,ith
respect to the impact of fraud upon the Holmes policy decisions, see Recent Case,
Statutory Interpretation-Second Circuit Holds that Health Care Funds Lack Standing to Sue
Tobacco Companies under RJCO, 113 HAv.% L. REV. 1063, 1065-68 (2000).
419 See Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 235-43.
420 See id. at 235-36. For applications of the remoteness approach in other cases,
see Bivens Gardens Office Building, Inc. v. Barnett Banks of Florida, Inc., 140 F.3d 898,
906-08 (11th Cir. 1998). See also McCarthy v. Recordex Sen-, Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 855
(3d Cir. 1996); Popkin v.Jacoby (In re Sunrise Sec. Litig.), 916 F.2d 874, 879 (3d Cir.
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court claimed that the directness must be shown "independent of and
in addition to other traditional elements of proximate cause."421 It
referred to other elements of proximate cause (like foreseeability) as
"additional requirements, not substitutes for alleging (and ultimately,
showing) a direct injury."422 Holmes, however, expressly warned
against any black-letter formulation such as the Second Circuit im-
posed on RICO. As Holmes explained, directness is not a threshold
inquiry, rather a conclusion reached at the end of analysis, following
the exploration of the three Holmes factors.423 The court's characteri-
zation of directness as being a necessary factor erroneously added an
independent factor to the Holmes analysis.
The Second Circuit's misreading of Holmes was based largely
upon a misinterpretation of the first Holmes factor, which questions
whether there are more "directly injured victims [who] can generally
be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general.1424
Instead of analyzing whether the Funds were the most directly injured
plaintiffs, the court reached a conclusion on directness without even
implementing the Holmes factors. The court concluded that the injury
to the Funds was derived from the harm to smokers.
[Wlithout injury to the individual smokers, the Funds would not
have incurred any increased costs in the form of the payment of
benefits, nor would they have experienced the difficulties of cost
prediction and control that constituted the crux of their infrastruc-
ture harms. Being purely contingent on the harm to third parties,
these injuries are indirect.
425
These steps taken to deny proximate cause flew in the face of
established law. The Court in Holmes was express about proximate
cause analysis being done on a case-by-case basis, and warned against
searching for a black-letter rule.426 The Court explained, "[0] ur use
of the term 'direct' should merely be understood as a reference to the
proximate-cause enquiry that is informed by the concerns set out in
the text."4
27
1990); Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 892 (7th Cir. 1990); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc.,
814 F.2d 22, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1987); Kempe v. Monitor Intermediaries, Inc., 785 F.2d
1443, 1444 (9th Cir. 1986).
421 Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 235.
422 Id. at 235-36.
423 See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 (1992).
424 Id. at 269-70.
425 Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 239.
426 See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272 n.20.
427 Id.
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Indeed, the Holmes factor analysis usually results in identifying the
most appropriate plaintiff to bring suit, but the Supreme Court did
not rule out the possibility that an analytically indirectly injured plain-
tiff could have standing. In dismissing the suit, citing insufficient di-
rectness, the Second Circuit departed not only from the position of
the Supreme Court, and those of other circuits, but from its own pre-
vious position as well.428
Having decided the appeal on its newly-minted basis-"derivi-
tive"- 9-the Second Circuit proceeded with the Holmes factor analy-
sis, claiming that disqualification from standing ias acceptable in
light of the "policy" factors of Holmes.43 0 However, the court never
identified a plaintiff better suited to bring the suit, ignoring the
Holmes Court's position on denial of standing. The Supreme Court
had warned that a plaintiff should be disallowed from proceeding
only if "the general interest in deterring injurious conduct" could be
better served by more directly injured victims.
43 1
The fact that the Second Circuit did not identify a better plaintiff
is particularly troublesome in the context of this RICO litigation. By
denying standing to the Funds, the court effectively immunized the
tobacco industry from RICO claims, since the individual smokers are
barred from suit under RICO due to the restriction that injury must
be to "business or property."432 Not only were the Funds deprived of
their right to be compensated for massive injury due to racketeering
activity of the industry, but Congress' intent that RICO be used to
remedy systematic fraud also has been undermined. 433 The statute, in
fact, was designed to be enforced privately, and the court's rule has
428 Se, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 541-42 (1983); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736
(1977); Isr. Travel Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Isr. Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.8d 1250, 1257
(7th Cir. 1995); Raybestos Prods. Co. v. Younger, 54 F.3d 1234, 1241-43 (7th Cir.
1995); Mid Ad. Telecom, Inc. v. Long Distance Sens., Inc., 18 F.d 260, 263 (4th Cir.
1994); Bieter Co. v. Blomquist, 987 F.2d 1319, 1325 (8th Cir. 1993); County of Suffolk
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1311 (2d Cir. 1990); Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm.
Mifrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 912-13 (2d Cir. 1988); Envtl. Tectonics %%
WV.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1066-67 (3d Cir. 1988), aJJ'd, 493 U.S. 400
(1990). These and other case precedents demonstrate that standing is often granted
to "indirectly" injured plaintiffs.
429 The Second Circuit thus ignored AGC's mandate that labels should be es-
chewed. See Associated Gen. Contrators, 459 U.S. at 536 n.33.
430 See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70.
431 Id. at 269.
432 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); se supra note 381.
433 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 519 (1985) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) ("Congress' concern [in passing RICO] was not for the direct ,ictims of the
racketeers' acts, whom state and federal laws already protected, but for the comped-
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handicapped an extremely large group of injured people from vindi-
cating their rights under RICO. 434
Just as was noted in the Third Circuit's opinion,435 the Second
Circuit also held that the difficulty in proving what percentage of a
smoker's injury could properly be attributed to the defendant's fraud
weighed in opposition to allowing standing. This causation calcula-
tion is not made more difficult by allowing the Funds standing.
The Second Circuit also misread Holmes to disallow recovery in
cases where damages were speculative.43 6 Holmes was concerned, not
with the speculativeness of damages, but with the relative difficulty of
proving damages. The Holmes Court was concerned with accurate al-
location, but stopped short of foreclosing recovery. "[T]he less direct
an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of a
plaintiff's damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other,
independent, factors."43 7 The Court's concern about difficulty of
proof assumes that another party with more easily ascertainable dam-
ages would bring the claim. A more direct victim is preferable, be-
cause "problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more
remotely" could be avoided.438 AGC and Holmes sought, not to pre-
vent claims from being brought at all, but to encourage "efficient en-
forcement" 43 9 of the statutes.
Also, the court's absolute judgment that the recovery would be
too speculative was premature, as the case had not even reached the
summary judgment or trial stage. Discovery had not been completed,
and evidence brought out in various state cases had been considered
acceptable causation showings. Curiously, the Second Circuit inti-
tors and investors whose businesses and interests are harmed or destroyed by
racketeers.").
434 See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151
(1987) ("[RICO] bring[s] to bear the pressure of 'private attorneys general' on a
serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed
inadequate.").
435 See supra Part VI.B.1.
436 The belief in the danger of speculative damages pervades many of the deci-
sions involving § 1964(c). Courts allow damages to be recovered if the amount of the
damages is speculative, but refuse to allow recovery when the fact of damage is, itself,
speculative. See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566
(1981).
437 Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992). However, the
conduct at issue need not be the sole cause of the injury. See Chisolm v. TranSouth
Fin. Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 337-39 (4th Cir. 1996).
438 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 270.
439 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732 (1977).
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mated that those suits would indeed meet RICO's proximate cause
requirements.440
In fact, calculating the Funds' damages would actually be less
speculative than doing so on an individual basis. The Funds, unlike
individuals, can aggregate damage calculations for many plan partici-
pants.44' It is far simpler to draw conclusions based on a larger sam-
ple of people and operate on the assumption that, because smoking
causes cancer, medical costs will be increased by some amount due to
smokers. Ascertaining that same percentage of medical cost increase
for one person would be far more challenging and, indeed, specula-
tive. As long as one takes as true the medical information regarding
the health risks of smoking, the connection between smoking and in-
creased medical costs cannot be called speculative. While it could be
difficult to prove the amount of damages, the Funds are entitled to
try. Following proof of the fact of damages, the jurisprudence of the
antitrust statute requires that courts impose a slightly less onerous
standard for proof of the extent of damages.44
2
The final error of the panel was to hold that a danger of duplica-
tive damages would be presented if employers or other health care
providers standing further down the causal chain might also sue and
recover.443 This argument fails as long as Holmes continues to be the
standard for proximate cause determinations, because the Funds
would stand as more direct victims than other employers.
444
On petition for rehearing, the Second Circuit withdrew its opin-
ion for consideration, then issued an amended opinion that had the
same conclusion, but added two footnotes that largely undercut their
original opinion.445 These footnotes indicated that the AGC and
Holmes analyses would continue to be the tests for the Second Circuit
in antitrust and RICO standing issues respectively, but that these anal-
yses were not controlling in the Funds cases."46
440 See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d
229, 236-37 (2d Cir. 1999), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 799 (2000).
441 See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d
560, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
442 SeeJ. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9, 123-25 (1969);
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1931).
443 See Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 240.
444 See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171
F.3d 912, 921 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 844 (2000).
445 See Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 234 n.3, 239 n.4.
446 See id.
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3. Ninth Circuit
The factual allegations made by the Oregon Laborers Benefit
Funds in Oregon Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip
Monis, Inc.,4 47 mirror those of other health care Funds arguing cases
before other circuit courts.448 The plaintiffs alleged that defendants
Philip Morris and other tobacco industry leaders engaged in a de-
cades-long conspiracy to conceal from the public information regard-
ing health risks of smoking.449 Among other illegal acts, the
defendants allegedly sought to perpetuate the myth that the link be-
tween smoking and disease could not be established with certainty.450
The plaintiff Funds claimed that they were prevented from taking
appropriate action to combat smoking among plan participants.
451
This failure to act was based upon fraudulent representations by the
industry. In addition to handicapping the unions due to misinforma-
tion, the industry did not allow the rate of smoking to naturally de-
cline, which created costs. Had the smoking rate dropped naturally,
there would have been lower costs for the Funds.452 Also, the Funds
alleged that fraud caused more people to begin smoking (partially
due to marketing targeted at children), thereby creating more ex-
penses for the union Fund.453 According to the plaintiffs, had the
fraud not occurred, it could have taken different measures to educate
and treat smoking participants.454 The Funds sought monetary relief
in order to make up for the wrongful diminishment of funds.
4 55
The Ninth Circuit immediately recognized the current Supreme
Court view on proximate cause: "Here we use 'proximate cause' to
label generically the judicial tools used to limit a person's responsibil-
ity for the consequences of that person's own acts. At bottom, the
notion of proximate cause reflects ideas of whatjustice demands, or of
what is administratively possible and convenient."45 6 However, the
court proceeded to misconstrue and misread current law. Relying
447 185 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 789 (2000). The plaintiffs
were six employee health and welfare benefits Funds. See id. at 961.
448 The Fund asserted federal RICO, state RICO, both federal and state antitrust,
and other various state claims. See id. at 962.
449 See id. at 961.






456 Id. at 963 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268
(1992)).
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heavily on the opinions of the Second and Third Circuits, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of standing to plaintiffs. 4 ,7
The court purported to employ the Holmes test, but made a proxi-
mate cause decision that did not reflect the balancing of policy fac-
tors. The court stated, "Both the Second and the Third Circuits have
held that a trust fund's claims are 'too remote' to allow recovery and
that the actions are therefore barred."458 It appeared that the Ninth
Circuit made a quick determination based on the decisions of the Sec-
ond and Third Circuits and then cursorily employed the Holmes factor
approach in an effort to defend its decision, rather than making an
independent judgment.
In trying to determine whether the Funds were the best suited
plaintiff to bring the claim, the court examined both the "direct" and
"indirect" injuries. The court characterized the "direct" injury as be-
ing based on a "one-link" causation chain.45 9 In so doing, the court
erroneously construed RICO to require an injury without connections
to a third party in order to recover.460 The court explained:
[A] 11 of plaintiff's claims rely on alleged injury to smokers-without
any injury to smokers, plaintiffs would not have incurred the addi-
tional expenses in paying for the medical expenses of those smok-
ers. Thus, there is no "direct" link between the alleged misconduct
of defendants and the alleged damage to plaintiffs.
46 '
As previously discussed, AGC sought to create a system under
which courts could judge the policy merits in allowing a claim to pro-
ceed.462 The Court expressly rejected labels such as "target" or "zone
of interest" and warned against employing a formal direct/indirect
analysis when doing proximate cause determinations. 463 To charac-
terize the Funds as having been only tangentially injured is to over-
look the facts alleged.
The Ninth Circuit's support for its decision rests on thin legal
grounds. The court recognized that no other plaintiff would be prop-
457 See i& at 964.
458 Id.
459 See id. at 963.
460 See id.
461 See id.; see also Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
191 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the claims were derivative and dam-
ages indirect), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 799 (2000).
462 See supra Part V.C.
463 See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536 n.33 (1983).
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erly situated to sue,464 but explained away this denial of remedies by
quoting AGC. "Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a
remedy in damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to
an antitrust violation."465 Nevertheless, the result was the court leav-
ing a very real injury unremedied and immunizing extremely culpable
defendants.
In its discussion of the supposed directness of injury, the court
then made a surprisingly naive comment. "[T]here is an identifiable
group of persons-smokers-whose self-interest will motivate them to
seek recovery of the damages caused by defendants' alleged wrongful
conduct. Although the smokers cannot 'vindicate the public interest
in antitrust [or RICO] enforcement,' they can 'remedy the harm done
by defendants' alleged misconduct.' "' 466 This interpretation reflects
little more than intellectual dishonesty on the part of the court in its
interpretation of AGC and Holmes. The statutes provide the remedies.
If those statutory avenues are closed to all possible plaintiffs, then the
industry has been immunized for its conduct under federal law. No
amount of "scolding" done on the part of those harmed by the indus-
try could amount to the remedies afforded by antitrust or RICO
law.467 Holmes and AGC refer to vindicating RICO and antitrust law,
respectively, when they discuss the most-directly-injured-plaintiff di-
lemma; they are not referring to state law or other forms of recourse.
Because both antitrust law and RICO have "business or property" re-
quirements, smokers may not bring personal injury claims under
these statutes.468 In addition, under the settled law of the Ninth Cir-
cuit, a smoker will usually be unable to recover any medical costs that
he did not pay himself.
4 69
464 See Or. Laborers, 185 F.3d at 964 (admitting that no smokers could sue under
RICO, but explaining that "Et]his inability does not, however, necessarily lead to the
conclusion that plaintiffs must therefore have standing").
465 Id. Actually, in its treatment of the Funds' request for injunctive relief, the
court misstated antitrust principles. The panel denied injunctive relief on the ground
that the Funds were neither consumers nor competitors in the restrained market. See
id. at 967. Contra Chelson v. Oregonian Publ'g Co., 715 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir.
1983) ("Although the dealers here are neither consumers nor competitors in the rele-
vant market, it is clear that their interests would directly be served by enhanced com-
petition in the market.").
466 Or. Laborers, 185 F.3d at 964 (citation omitted).
467 For a clear picture of how individual lawsuits against the tobacco industry have
fared, see Mosler v. S/P Enters., Inc., 888 F.2d 1138, 1143 (7th Cir. 1989); Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of NJ., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 560, 571 (E.D.N.Y.
1999); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 418-20 (D.NJ. 1993).
468 See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979); supra note 381.
469 See Steele v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 36 F.3d 69, 70-71 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Although first admitting that "actual damages attributable to
medical payments made by plaintiffs due to smoking-related injuries
would be as easy to ascertain in the present case as in a direct action
by the smokers,"470 the court went on to conclude that ultimately
damage calculation would prove to be a burdensome undertaking.47'
It attempted to bolster its opinion by citing the Second Circuit opin-
ion that discussed the speculative nature of damages incurred by rea-
son of a conspiracy resulting in the Funds not taking action to provide
smoking cessation programs to its members.472 Using the Second Cir-
cuit's words with respect to speculation, the court said, "[t]hese con-
cerns become particularly pointed in a case, like the present one,
where the injuries are alleged to derive not simply from defendants'
affirmative misconduct but also from plaintiffs' fraudulently induced
inaction."473 Again, this distinction is unhelpful because the differ-
ence between fraud that induces inaction and fraud that induces ac-
tion is immaterial in seeking to recover for that fraud.474
To sum up its observation regarding speculativeness, the court
explained, "[t] he difficulty of ascertaining the damages attributable to
defendants' alleged wrongful conduct and the complexity involved in
calculating these damages weigh heavily, if not dispositively, in favor
of barring plaintiffs' actions."47 5 The Ninth Circuit, like the Second
Circuit, misunderstood the effectiveness of statistical modeling and
aggregation. Instead of recognizing that those techniques actually in-
crease the accuracy of determining damages by discounting individual
variances that cannot be treated on a case-by-case basis, the court felt
that these techniques would be insufficient to make a proper damage
calculation.476 Accordingly, it concluded that the speculative factor
weighed against allowing recovery.
The court referred to the likelihood of other smokers' suits when
it found that this Holmes factor-duplicative recovery and complex ap-
portionment-also weighed in favor of denial of standing.477 Al-
though the court recognized that there "may be some protection from
470 Or. Laborers, 185 F.3d at 964.
471 See id at 964-65.
472 See id. at 965.
473 1& at 965 (quoting Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 172 F.3d 223, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1999)).
474 See supra note 389 and accompanying text.
475 Or. Laborers, 185 F.3d at 965.
476 See id.
477 See id. (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992)
(citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 543-44 (1983))).
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multiple recovery in state law," it nevertheless concluded that "this
safeguard would not cure the ultimate problem-that the courts
would be forced 'to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages
among plaintiffs at different levels of injury from the violative
acts.' "4
78
The Ninth Circuit opinion essentially mandates that smokers'
causes of action be relegated to either state personal injury or other
theories to recover medical costs-antitrust and RICO claims are pre-
cluded.479 The court concluded that "[a]ll three factors of the 're-
moteness' test weigh in favor of barring plaintiffs' claims."480 While
the court cited the Holmes test correctly, it radically misconceived its
purpose. The Ninth Circuit, like the others before it, effectively
deselected all federal plaintiffs, rather than selecting among several
options in order to determine the best suited plaintiff. Vindication of
the federal interests in enforcing the antitrust laws and RICO should
be brought under federal, not state, law.
4. Seventh Circuit
Following closely on the heels of other circuits to take up the
issues, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals of the complaints of
insurance companies (not union funds), namely Arkansas Blue Cross
and Blue Shield ("Blues") in their case against Philip Morris.48
1
a. District Court Analysis
The Blues' suit contained the same allegations of deceit on the
part of the industry-including misrepresentations of the health con-
sequences of smoking, suppression of information about the scientific
developments toward a safer cigarette, and an active campaign to con-
fuse the public about the information available regarding smoking in
general.48 2 This systematic fraud included concealment of informa-
tion regarding the addictive properties of nicotine and the targeting
478 Id.
479 See id. at 966.
480 Id.
481 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip
Morris Inc., 196 F.3d 818, 820-28 (7th Cir. 1999), rev-Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 936, 938 (N.D. Ill. 1999). This case is a consoli-
dation of the actions of several plaintiff Funds against Philip Morris, Inc. It included
both insurance companies and Funds. See id.
482 See id. at 821; see also Ciresi et al., supra note 165, at 481-89 (detailing the
efforts of many to hold the tobacco industry liable for its fraudulent conduct and the
information retrieved through discovery in those cases).
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of young people for tobacco sales.48s The conduct was alleged to vio-
late both antitrust and RICO statutes.
484
The industry proposed the adoption of a black-letter rule regard-
ing remoteness that would bar the claim of a third-party payor of med-
ical expenses,4 8 5 but the district court found that the Blues' injuries
were indeed their own, rather than derivative. 486 The district court
explained that, with respect to the RICO claims, the policy-driven
proximate cause inquiry under Holmes sufficed to survive a motion to
dismiss.
[I]t does not seem to me that a motion to dismiss is the time to
decide that plaintiffs will not be allowed to present their proof. I
also do not think there is likely to be such difficulty in apportioning
damages that a claim should not be allowed to proceed. Finally, I
do disagree that plaintiffs are likely to be reimbursed by smokers'
actions against defendants. The undeniably high expense undoubt-
edly prevents all but the very few (those with the worst injuries, and
probably very few of those) from attempting such suits.
4 87
b. The Seventh Circuit's Response
Despite the careful and correct analysis of the district court, on
appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed its decision.4ss The court began
with a diatribe about the tobacco litigation in general.48 9 The tone of
its opening words immediately evidenced an unwillingness to inde-
.pendently evaluate the arguments of the plaintiffs. The opinion be-
gins, "States that sued the tobacco companies have been promised
more than $200 billion in settlement .... Awed by this success, health
insurers... have filed me-too suits .. . .490 The panel summarized
the failure of these suits before other circuits and characterized the
litigation strategy as follows: "They want to recover directly from to-
483 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamstemr, Local 734, 196 F.3d at 823.
484 See id. at 822.
485 Here, as in the other suits, the industry relied upon reasoning like that in the
150-year-old Slaid case. See supra Part lV.E. It hardly seems appropriate, however, to
use the framework of a case between two individuals for the standard in a case be-
tween the tobacco industry and those it defrauded, especially when defendants ig-
nored the "willful exception" to Staid. See supra text accompan)ing note 235.
486 SeeArk. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Philip Morris, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 2d 936, 938
(N.D. IM. 1999), rev'd sub no. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare
Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 196 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 1999).
487 Id. at 938.
488 See Int'l Bhd. of Teansters, Local 734, 196 F. 3d at 828.
489 See id. at 820-22.
490 Id. at 820. "[S]tatejudges are more liberal than federal judges ith other peo-
ple's money." Id. at 821.
200
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
bacco producers precisely in order to bypass the elements of subroga-
tion actions-principally, that the insurer demonstrate the existence
of a tort and the lack of any defenses to liability."
491
The panel's subrogation argument is wrong in two respects. First,
it depends upon an erroneous characterization of the Funds as insur-
ers when, in fact, they are a creature of federal statute. 492 The Funds
are not insurance companies. 493 It was wrong to treat the Funds
before the Seventh Circuit (and by reference the Funds before other
circuit courts) the same as the Blues, who are insurers.494 Even if in-
surers are required to proceed by way of subrogation, the Funds may
sue directly. Second, the panel failed to recognize that, even given
the availability of a subrogation claim, antitrust and RICO theories
would still be viable alternatives open to the plaintiffs.
The panel objected to the tactical decision of the Blues to sue the
tobacco companies directly.495 It claimed that the suit was an effort to
"strip [their] adversaries of all defenses."496 The reasoning of the
opinion is confusing. The panel explains:
A third-party payor has no claim if its insured did not suffer a tort;
no rule of law requires persons whose acts cause harm to cover all of
the costs, unless these acts were legal wrongs. The food industry
puts refined sugar in many products, making them more tasty; as a
result some people eat too much (or eat the wrong things) and suf-
fer health problems and early death. No one supposes, however,
that sweet foods are defective products on this account; chocoholics
can't recover in tort from Godiva Chocolatier; it follows that the
Funds and the Blues can't recover from Godiva either. The same
491 Id.
492 The Funds vary from insurance companies in that participants do not pay pre-
miums, rather, the relationship is akin to a trustee/beneficiary relationship. See FMC
Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1990). In order to raise contributions to the
Funds, a bargaining agreement must be reached. See id. Furthermore, workers have
no claim to the money collected by the Funds. See id.
493 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2) (1994).
494 See Daniel M. Fox et al., Between Public and Private: A Half Century of Blue Cross
and Blue Shield in N.Y., 16J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 643, 647-48 (1991). Blue Cross
has been described as "both a business and, in its roles as collaborator and fiscal
intermediary, an ally and even an agent of government." Id.
495 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734, 196 F.3d at 823. This objection was un-
founded. The Seventh Circuit itself previously allowed the Blues to bring an antitrust
claim directly. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65
F.3d 1406, 1414-15 (7th Cir. 1995). "Blue Cross paid... directly, in accordance with
Blue Cross's contractual obligations to its insureds, and if it paid too much because
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reasoning applies when the defendant is Philip Morris. If, as the
Funds and the Blues say, the difference is that Philip Morris has
committed civil wrongs while Godiva has not, then the v.ay to estab-
lish this is through tort suits .... 497
The unfortunate analogy to the chocolate industry did not
strengthen the panel's position. The Blues are victims of fraud and
thus are entitled to sue for the damages of the fraudulent conduct.
The court argued that 'fraud' requires reliance in its comparison of
tobacco and chocolate.498 It missed the point, however, that fraud is
not limited to misrepresentations. 499
The Seventh Circuit opinion did not explain in detail the court's
reasons for denying standing. Instead, it "just hit the highlights, men-
tioning only [its] principal reasons for agreeing with" the other cir-
cuits.500 The opinion referred to the previous circuit court holdings
that ruled that the Funds' losses are too remote to permit antitrust
recovery. o50
i. Antitrust Claims
The Blues brought the antitrust suit under a direct purchase the-
ory because they purchased health care services and goods from other
providers and thus were injured directly when the defendants' con-
spiracy eliminated competition in the development of safer ciga-
rettes.502 "Here, the Blues' antitrust claim focuses on a conspiracy
affecting product safety, not price."503 An unreasonable restraint on
497 Id.
498 See id.
499 See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987); United States v. Falcone,
934 F.2d 1528, 1539 n.28 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that fraud includes "both schemes
to defraud that do [and do not] involve false pretenses or representations").
500 Int'l BluL of Teamsters, Local 734, 196 F.3d at 822.
501 See id.
502 SeeBrief of Plaintiff-Appellants at 11, 35-40, ComplaintAll6 271, Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of NJ., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
Furthermore, that the tobacco manufacturers knowingly passed on costs to health
care payers makes the injury foreseeable. "If true, the allegations demonstrate that
the defendants have been reaping profits at the health industry's expense." Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of NJ., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 560, 584
(E.D.N.Y. 1999).
503 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 36, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 (Nos.
99-3396, 99-3397); se, e.g., Chelson v. Oregonian Publ'g Co., 715 F.2d 136S, 1371
(9th Cir. 1993) ("[A]Ithough the dealers here are neither consumers nor competitors
in the relevant market, it is clear that their interests would directly be served by en-
hanced competition in the market."); see also Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp.
Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1333-34 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that customer or competi-
tor status is not a requirement for antitrust standing).
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competition to produce a superior product, however, has been held
to constitute an antitrust injury.50 4 Also, under the Sherman Act, lim-
iting output is illegal per se.50 5 Accordingly, the plaintiffs' allegations
are within the parameters of the antitrust laws.
ii. An Incomplete Associated General Contractors Analysis
The panel moved through a perfunctory discussion of antitrust
law, failing to mention most of the AGC policy factors, but concluding
that no direct antitrust injury was alleged.50 6 It claimed that
"[i] nsurers' injury arises only indirectly.... Permitting the insurers to
recover creates a risk of multiple recovery, for smokers could file anti-
trust actions on their own behalf."507 The court reasoned that "the
direct purchaser-the consumer who either paid too much for the
product, or did not have access to a better product at the same
price-is the smoker."508 While smokers are also direct purchasers
and were directly injured by antitrust violations, this conclusion does
not take into account the role of the Blues as direct purchasers in the
market for a safer cigarette, which was a restrained market. The
panel's decision shortsightedly mentions only the output of cigarettes.
"[T] he Funds and Blues do not say that the output of cigarettes is too
low as a result of a conspiracy; they say it is too highl "509 The panel
failed to address the fact that the defendants' conspiracy to suppress
development efforts to manufacture a safer tobacco product, which
reduced the production of such products down to nothing, resulted
in a loss to the Blues' business or property. This loss took the form of
money that they would not have spent but for the illegal conduct.
The characterization of the Blues as only derivatively injured has
little merit, because the Blues sought to recover money they paid on
behalf of their insureds. This reality is important especially with re-
spect to the AGC/Holmes inquiries into whether there is a "readily
identifiable class of more directly injured persons able to vindicate the
statute."510 Because the Blues paid the costs directly, no need arises to
trace the effects of the wrongdoing through any other party. In this
504 See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500-01
(1988).
505 See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 406-07 (1945).
506 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734, 196 F.3d at 823.
507 Id.
508 Id.
509 Id. at 825.
510 Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-69 (1992); Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
532-35 (1983).
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case, no one is more directly injured or better suited to bring the
case.51
1
Both smokers and non-smokers bear the costs of the fraud the
tobacco companies perpetrated upon the American public, since
smokers do not pay directly for medical treatment, and non-smokers
cannot recover for the indirect payments that are higher due to in-
creased premiums. The third-party insurers are left paying the price
for the tobacco companies' fraud. The District Court for the Eastern
District of New York aptly explained:
Recognizing a direct cause of action on the part of the Blues is con-
sistent with the role plaintiffs play in today's society. In the same
way that a spouse or parent has an obligation to provide for the
medical injuries of his spouse or child, non-profit medical providers
such as the Blues have an obligation to supply medical care to their
covered populations. More and more, medical providers such as
the Blues have assumed the responsibility for ensuring that individ-
uals have access to medical care. For the nearly [seventy] million
people, one out of every four Americans, who rely on the Blues to
provide their medical care, plaintiffs occupy a type ofparenspatriae
relationship with their insured which is analogous to the parent-
child relationship.
512
This unique stature in the health care system led the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York to correctly say, "[the
Blues] stand in the best position to remedy the wrongs defendants
have allegedly inflicted upon the American health care system."
513
iii. Damage Apportionment and Calculation
The panel concluded, without a careful analysis, that the suit
posed a "horrible problem of damages calculation-and difficulty in
calculating damages because the plaintiff's injury [was] remote from
511 See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of NJ., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d
560, 576 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
Only the Blues possess the equitable and legal claim to the costs they have
incurred in the medical care and treatment of tobacco users and passive
breathers of cigarette smoke. Only the Blues can claim the "injury to busi-
ness or property" required by the RICO statute. The Blues are the "proper
plaintiffs; they have the necessary incentive and means to vindicate society's
interest in enforcing the statute.
Id.
512 Id. at 581.
513 Id. at 585.
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the antitrust violation .... "1 5 14 As already discussed, this conclusion
ignored the role of the Blues as direct purchasers.
The court also claimed that computing damages would be diffi-
cult due to the nature of smokers' risk-taking and other intervening
causes.5 15 This argument is particularly problematic because the exis-
tence of intervening causes, as discussed previously, does not defeat
claims against one or more tortfeasors. As the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York explained:
[T] he Blues are likely to have extensive documentation with respect
to the medical care they have provided to their insured .... The
aggregation of millions of alleged injuries in the instant suit can be
expected to yield more accurate results with respect to the causation
issue since projections based upon a large statistical base will be
available, thus reducing the size of the possible error.5 16
There is no danger in having a duplicate recovery because this
case was brought under a direct purchase theory, so no other plaintiff
could recover for this injury. Therefore, the need to apportion dam-
ages also will not arise. "Here, there is no question of double count-
ing: plaintiffs seek only to recover the money they themselves paid,
not the money someone else paid. It is not double counting that de-
fendants seek to avoid, but any counting at all."517 The need to appor-
tion damages will also not arise, but even if it did, the single
satisfaction rule and the defense of payment would operate to prevent
more than one payment for the same injury.518
iv. Speculativeness of Damages
Given the vastness of the harm they have caused, it is hollow for the
defendants to argue that damages are too "speculative" or to ques-
tion what products defendants would have produced but for the
514 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734, 196 F.3d at 823.
515 See id.
516 Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 575 (citations omitted).
The argument simplified holds: If smoking causes lung cancer in nine out of ten
smokers, it can be said to be more certain that nine out of ten lung cancer insureds
have that lung cancer due to smoking rather than that smoking by one individual
caused that individual's lung cancer.
517 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 21, Int'l Bhid. of Teamnsters, Local 734 (Nos.
99-3396, 3397).
518 The single satisfaction rule would prohibit duplicative damages from being col-
lected from a single defendant. See Morley v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 1006, 1012-13 (4th Cir.
1989) (citing both RICO and antitrust cases); Singer v. Olympia Brewing Co., 878
F.2d 596, 599-601 (2d Cir. 1989) (RICO).
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conspiracy, how many smokers would have switched to safer prod-
ucts, what health effects would have been, and so forth.419
The Seventh Circuit's discussion of speculativeness of damages,
however, sharply varied from the other circuits. It frankly admitted
that "statistical methods could provide a decent answer-likely a more
accurate answer than is possible when addressing the equivalent cau-
sation question in a single person's suit,"52 0 but the panel then back-
tracked and continued, "[n]o, the problem for insurers is
determining what it means for a financial intermediary to be injured
by paying for medical care."5 2 1 Instead of focusing on whether relative
difficulty of proof would make damages harder to calculate than they
would be with another plaintiff, the panel re-characterized the issue as
whether paying out costs (even if they are increased due to fraudulent
conduct) is indeed an injury to the insurers' business or property.
The panel's reasoning is troublesome. It said, "Everyone dies
eventually, usually after illness. An insurer must cover these costs even
if the cause is natural. To determine damages, therefore, it is essential
to compare the costs the insurers actually incurred against the costs
they would have incurred had cigarettes been safer."52 The panel
seems to have convinced itself that, despite the mounds of evidence
about the tobacco industry's decades-long suppression of information
about the nature and effects of cigarette smoking, insurance compa-
nies would have had to pay those amounts anyway, because "everyone
dies."
v. A Flawed Holmes Analysis
The Seventh Circuit's most glaring errors appeared in its discus-
sion of RICO and the proximate cause requirements. The panel be-
gan by stating, "[t]he injury for which the plaintiffs seek
compensation is remote indeed ... .152 3 This statement reflects the
precise mistake that the Holmes court warned against-making a re-
moteness declaration without first proceeding through the multi-fac-
tor analysis. This "remoteness" conclusion was made based on the fact
that the Funds do not deal directly with the tobacco companies and
culminated in the characterization of the Funds' injuries as mere "re-
519 Brief of Plaintffs-Appellees at 26, Int'l Bd. of Teamsters, Local 734 (Nos.
99-3396, 99-3397).
520 Int'l Bh. of Teamsters, Local 734, 196 F.3d at 823.
521 Id.
522 Id. at 823-24.
523 Id. at 825.
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verberation[s] from smokers' decisions."5 24 According to the Seventh
Circuit, smokers voluntarily assume the risks of smoking.
5 25
While this might be true for some of the adult population, it fails
to address the problem of youth smoking.526 A child who is not old
enough to appreciate the risks of smoking certainly cannot assume
those risks.527 "A greater degree of care is generally owed to children
because of their lack of capacity to appreciate risks and to avoid dan-
ger."528 Given that information about addiction is fairly new, this ar-
gument is especially problematic with respect to then-children
smokers.529 The allegations regarding the industry's targeting of the
youth market and the manipulation of nicotine levels should have suf-
ficed to convince the panel that assumption of the risk was not a
proper ground in making a policy decision about remoteness. 30
Due to the RICO violations, the Blues also suffered injury to their
business or property by paying increased sums of money for their
plans' participants. In fact, the injury alleged falls squarely within the
ambit of the business or property requirement as interpreted by the
Supreme Court. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,53 1 the Court explained:
"When a commercial enterprise suffers a loss of money it suffers an
injury in both its 'business' and its 'property' .... A consumer whose
money has been diminished by reason of an antitrust violation has
524 Id. at 821.
525 See id. at 822.
526 "Most people who suffer the adverse health consequences of using cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco begin their use before they reach age 18, an age when they are
not prepared for, or equipped to, make a decision that, for many, will have lifelong
consequences." Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398
(Aug. 28, 1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897).
527 Astonishingly, the court failed to discuss the facts of youth smoking. A child is
certainly incapable of appreciating and assuming such a deadly risk. John Stuart Mill
addressed children in the law in On Liberty. He believed liberty belonged "only to
human beings in the maturity of their faculties . . . [not children] below the age
which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood." JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERlT 10 (Alburey Castell ed., Harlan Davidson 1947) (1859).
528 McDaniel v. Sunset Manor Co., 269 Cal. Rptr. 196, 199 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); see
also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 172, § 18, at 115 ("Capacity exists when the minor
has the ability of the average person to understand and weigh the risks and
benefits.").
529 See Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 430 (Tex. 1997) ("[A]s late
as 1988... the danger of addiction from smoking cigarettes was not widely known
and recognized in the community in general, or, particularly, by children or
adolescents.").
530 See id.
531 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
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been injured 'in his ... property' within the meaning of [section
four] ."532 RICO is an appropriate remedy precisely because the stat-
ute was "intended to remedy the range of economic costs of racketeer-
ing, including those economic costs racketeers inflict when they
choose to achieve their aims through a pattern of violence and physi-
cal injury or by fraud calculated to injure the person."5 33 The racke-
teering-caused injury to the plaintiff is separate and distinct from the
harm to the smokers. The Blues need not prove that smokers would
prevail against the defendant in order to maintain an action.
The Holmes factor test is granted one paragraph in the opinion, in
which the panel states, after declaring that the injury is too remote,
that the "chain of causation [is] long, the risk of double recovery pal-
pable because smokers can file their own RICO suits, and the damages
wickedly hard to calculate."-5 4 The Seventh Circuit ignores the cen-
tral objective of both AGC and Holmes, that is, determining the best
federal enforcer between two possible victims.
The errors of the panel's assessment are stark. To begin, a con-
clusion of remoteness should follow the factor inquiry. The court
failed to ask whether a more direct plaintiff could sue. It erroneously
claimed smokers could file their own suits-which is plainly false with
respect to RICO claims.53 5 A simple declaration that the damages
would be "wickedly hard" to calculate does nothing to explain why
such an assessment would be so challenging as to outweigh the oppor-
tunity to vindicate the plaintiffs' injuries under the statute.
5. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit is the latest circuit court to hear a health Fund's
case against the tobacco industry. In Texas Carpenters Health Benefit
Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., the court dismissed the plaintiffs' allegations
as remote.536 The plaintiffs' claims mirrored those alleged by other
Funds, namely, that as a result of violations of RICO and antitrust law,
they suffered injury to their business or property.53 7 The Fifth Circuit
summarily dismissed the claims, relying exclusively on the decisions of
the other circuits. It agreed with the other dismissals and said it had
532 Id. at 339.
533 Nat'l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 221,
231 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
534 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Mor-
ris Inc., 196 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 1999).
535 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsten, Local 734, 196 F.3d at 826.
536 199 F.3d 788, 789 (5th Cir. 2000).
537 See id. at 789. The Funds invoked federal antitrust and RICO, as vell as state
law claims. See i.
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"no need to write further."538 The panel did briefly explain their deci-
sion by saying, "the [F]unds' lawsuits constitute an illegitimate end-
run around principles of subrogation. '' 3 9 As above, the panel's asser-
tion that the claim could only be brought as a subrogation claim ig-
nores established law. The Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit both
hold that the plaintiff who brings a case may determine upon which
legal theory to rely.540 Ironically, Judge Jones, author of the panel's
opinion, also wrote the 1990 opinion in Kidd v. Southwest Airlines, Co.,
which explained Fair v. Kohler Die & Speciality Co.'s statement that the
plaintiff is "the master to decide what law he will rely upon."541 The
availability of a subrogation claim, therefore, ought not to extinguish
the right of a plaintiff to bring a RICO case or make a RICO claim
somehow "illegitimate."
CONCLUSION
Aside from the numerous errors of law previously discussed in
this Note, other reasons may be marshaled to show why the circuits'
responses to the tobacco litigation were improper.
The alleged fear of a flood of litigation following a judgment
against the tobacco companies is factually unfounded. In fact, the
statute of limitations has run on most of the claims that could possibly
be brought. Legally, smokers cannot bring individual claims under
RICO, because under the statute, personal injuries are not recover-
able.542 As far as other industries (chocolate, alcohol, et cetera) are
concerned, it is highly unlikely that any other plaintiffs could prove
the necessary elements to bring a RICO claim. Unless fraud is far
more widespread in America than anyone supposes, the tobacco in-
dustry is unique. Any other antitrust claims are also unlikely; there
have been very few situations involving such widespread collusion
spanning an entire industry, as is evident in the case of the tobacco
industry.
The Holmes decision could not be a more clear outline of the
proper approach for courts to make proximate cause determinations.
538 Id.
539 Id. at 790.
540 See Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 22-26 (1913); see also Kidd v.
S.W. Airlines, Co., 891 F.2d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining that a plaintiff may
chose a state forum even if a federal forum would have been open to her).
541 Kidd, 891 F.2d at 544; see also Fair, 228 U.S. at 25 (holding that the plaintiff
determines the law upon which he will base his claim), cited with approval in Caterpil-
lar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 n.7 (1987).
542 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); supra note 381 and accompany-
ing text.
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The Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits' misapplication of
Holmes and the subsequent piggybacking of the Fifth Circuit illustrate
the very dangers that the Supreme Court wrarned against.
The development of proximate cause principles revealed
throughout history illustrates that, at bottom, proximate cause is a pol-
icy-based decision. This being so, the response of the circuit courts to
the tobacco litigation represents an effort to blame remote causation
for their decisions that policy dictates that tobacco companies should
be immunized against the insurance companies they defrauded. The
result is a convolution of proximate cause principles and an utter fail-
ure to follow Supreme Court precedent.
The failure to identify the best plaintiff to represent the public
interest is the worst mistake made by each panel. Even decisions deny-
ing antitrust or RICO standing stress the importance of the iden-
tifiability of another plaintiff who would bring tie most effective
suit. 3 Standing should never be denied if doing so will be "likely to
leave a significant antitrust violation undetected or unremedied."A4
*
The absence of another plaintiff in the tobacco suits is a relevant fac-
tor weighing on the side of allowing the suits to proceed on both anti-
trust and RICO theories. The Supreme Court did not fathom a
situation in which one plaintiff would be declared too remote without
naming another plaintiff better situated to bring the case. In this par-
ticular case, to eliminate the ability for anyone to represent those in-
terests and to obtain a judgment against the industry is a travesty.
In a complex economy, injuries to business and property are often
mediated through effects on third parties. If a claim involving a
straightforward and well documented causal chain can be disquali-
fied simply because the chain can be described as indirect, then the
RICO and antitrust statutes will be eviscerated.
5 45
The circuits defend their decision to deny standing with, among
other reasons, the claim that there is a danger of duplicitive damages
and the claim that damages would be too difficult to compute. In
fact, damages could be estimated with considerable precision, and
there is no danger of duplicitive recovery because, as has been demon-
strated, there are no other viable plaintiffs. Additionally, the nature
of the injury to the insurers is distinct from the injury to the insured,
543 See generally Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1995) (anti-
trust); Mendelovitz v. Vosicky, 40 F.3d 182 (7th Cir. 1994) (RICO).
544 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 542 (1983).
545 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3-4, Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Wel-
fare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999), ce. denial, 120 S. Ct. 844
(2000) (No. 98-1426).
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although they arise from the same nexus of fact. Finally, both the
single satisfaction rule as well as the defense of payment would protect




Defendants' misconduct constitutes one of the worst legal and
moral outrages of this era. Defendants have succeeded in per-
verting established scientific, public health, economic, governmen-
tal, and legal mechanisms for dealing with a major social problem,
through deception, fraud, and anticompetitive conduct, with the
single ultimate goal of preserving their profits, no matter what the
cost.
5 4 7
The tobacco litigation was and continues to be a grandiose disap-
pointment to those involved and those studying it. The judges had
before them more than sufficient evidence linking the industry to
countless acts of fraud and deception. Their response has been to
avoid doing the hard job of holding a powerful industry accountable
for its serious misconduct. Some of the circuits suggested that per-
haps the solution lay within the power of the legislature. That answer
revealed an utter unwillingness to interpret the statutes before them
and, in so doing, to remedy very clear violations of both RICO and
antitrust law. The tobacco industry has proven itself powerful enough
to sway the minds of Congressmen and Senators voting on regulation
of the industry. In fact, Attorney GeneralJanet Reno has recently had
to ask a reluctant Congress for funding just to proceed with the gov-
ernment's case against the tobacco industry and has urged Congress
not to "allow politics to interfere with the conduct of litigation and the
final determination of the liability of the tobacco companies." 48 For
the judiciary to throw the issues back to the legislature was to ignore
the facts and law before them. The victims are not only the smokers
who relied to their detriment on the representations and claims of the
tobacco industry and became addicted to its deadly product, but also
future litigants who will suffer the effects these cases have worked
upon antitrust law and RICO interpretations.
546 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971);
Singer v. Olympia Brewing Co., 878 F.2d 596, 599-601 (2d Cir. 1989).
547 Brief for Appellants at 7, Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 844 (2000) (No.
98-1426).
548 Department ofJustice, Weekly Media Availability with Attorney General Janet Reno
Also Participating: David Ogden, Asst. Attorney General for the Civil Courts, at http://
ivw.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2000/100500agavail.htm (last modified Oct. 6, 2000).
[VOL- 76-1
